Shimon Peres, Last Founder of Israel, Father of Nuclear Program and More…

Shimon Peres, former prime minister, defense minister, and finally (non-political) president of Israel, has died at age 93 — and an impressive array of world figures are mourning.

shimon peres, covert operations, spies against armageddon, iran nuclearThey think of him as a man of peace and reconciliation — dreaming of a Middle East that can be incredibly more positive, creative, and productive than it is now.   Peres proudly declared himself an optimist, saying that that was the secret of his longevity.  He shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 with Yitzhak Rabin (his rival within the Labor Party, but by the time Rabin was assassinated in 1995 they were close colleagues in exploring peace possibilities with the Palestinians) and the PLO chief, Yasser Arafat.

Peres’s role in strengthening Israel’s defenses — indeed the Jewish state’s survivability — is not widely and fully known.   We have written, in our books, of the work he did — as a young aide who was very close to the first prime minister David Ben-Gurion — to make a deal with France for construction of an atomic reactor near Dimona, in Israel’s Negev Desert.  Peres and Ben-Gurion were the leaders of a small corps of Israelis who knew the real purpose and the real result: an arsenal of nuclear weapons, still not officially acknowledged by Israel.

Peres also made sure that Israel Military Industries would be a world-class manufacturer of arms, and Israel now boasts some of the best defense technology and innovations — which sell well around the world.

We salute him, above all, for speaking publicly about the possibility that if reasonable men and women could come together and make necessary compromises, there could be peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

 

September 28, 2016

White House Honor for Israel’s Peres, With Critical Issues Looming

By Dan Raviv originally posted in June 2012

Here in Washington, Israel’s President Shimon Peres is enjoying the highest possible American government accolades — receiving the Medal of Freedom Award from President Barack Obama.
shimon peres, israel spy, spies against armageddon, israel covert operationsThe 88-year-old, still in good health and mentally sharp, now holds a ceremonial post; but in past decades Peres was a senior defense official, a cabinet minister in several capacities, and prime minister of Israel.   He pops up often in our book, Spies Against Armageddon, as he was entrusted by Israel’s first prime minister — David Ben-Gurion — with carrying out the fateful, secret decision to develop nuclear weapons.
Peres also has been an active peacemaker, whenever peace efforts seem possible in the Middle East, and he calls on the current coalition government in his country to make stronger efforts at re-starting peace talks with the Palestinians.
In remarks prepared for delivery on Wednesday evening at the White House, President Obama praises the newest Medal of Freedom honoree:

“The United States is fortunate to have many allies and partners around the world.  Of course, one of our strongest allies, and one of our closest friends, is the State of Israel.  And no individual has done so much over so many years to build our alliance and bring our two nations closer as the leader we honor tonight—our friend, Shimon Peres.

“…in him we see the essence of Israel itself—an indomitable spirit that will not be denied. … Shimon knows the necessity of strength.  As Ben-Gurion said, ‘an Israel capable of defending herself—which cannot be destroyed—can bring peace nearer.’

“And so he’s worked with every American President since John F. Kennedy.  And it’s why I’ve worked with Prime Minister Netanyahu to ensure that the security cooperation between the United States and Israel is closer and stronger than it has ever been.  Because the security of the State of Israel is non-negotiable.  And the bonds between us are unbreakable.

“And yet, Shimon knows that a nation’s security depends, not just on the strength of its arms, but upon the righteousness of its deeds—its moral compass.  He knows, as Scripture teaches, that we must not only seek peace, we must pursue it.  And so it has been the cause of his life—peace, security and dignity, for Israelis and Palestinians and all Israel’s Arab neighbors.”

September 27, 2016

Is it Surprising? “PLO’s Abbas Was a KGB Agent”

[This article was written by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, for The Jerusalem Post newspaper.]

The revelation that Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, whose Fatah nom de guerre is Abu Mazen, was a KGB agent shouldn’t surprise those knowledgeable of the PLO movement and the Soviet Union’s methods.

Since its creation in 1959, the Fatah group and later the PLO were influenced and supported by various Arab intelligence communities, the KGB, and its satellite security services in the communist bloc. Beyond solidifying ideological bonds, the cooperation was a marriage of convenience.

The PLO needed financial support, military training and weapons. The Soviet Union, entangled in the Cold War with the West, wanted to increase its influence in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern Europe supported “progressive” movements and groups around the globe, including those who were involved in terrorism.

Abbas and his Cabinet in Ramallah: Only KGB Spy is Man in the Middle?

Abbas and his Cabinet in Ramallah: Only KGB Spy is Man in the Middle?

While the Soviet Union tried to keep its hands clean, it instructed the security services of its client state to do the dirty work. The East German Stasi and also the Hungarian and Bulgarian agencies trained PLO officers, gave them weapons and documents, and hosted notorious terrorists such as Abu Nidal, Carlos and Wadi Haddad. The Black September terrorists who killed the 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics traveled via East Berlin.

Yasser Arafat himself was photographed by the Securitate, the Romanian security service, in an intimate position in his hotel room in the company of his bodyguards while visiting Bucharest.

The Soviet Union gave grants to and hosted thousands of students from Asia, Africa, South and Central America at its universities.

The Soviet generosity was also a tool to recruit agents of all sorts among the foreign students.

Based on the belief that “quantity will turn into quality,” the KGB method was to recruit as many agents as possible, hoping that some of them would reach the top of their countries or organizations and be a quality agent.

Was Abu Mazen one of them? It shouldn’t be ruled out, despite his denials. In such circumstances, a denial by the president of the Palestinian Authority is only to be expected.

If it’s true, it happened when he studied in the early 1980’s at Moscow’s Oriental University, where he submitted his PhD thesis. But we still don’t know — from the Soviet-era document that reportedly names Mahmoud Abbas as a KGB mole in the PLO — how long he was run as an agent, how often he met with his controller, whether he was a paid agent and if so how much was he paid, or whether he was just an agent of influence who from time to time shared bits of information or estimates with his Soviet contacts.

If indeed he was a full-fledged agent, it was a good catch for the KGB. Abu Mazen was among the founding fathers of Fatah and a close friend of Arafat and the other top leaders of the group. Although throughout his career he mostly dealt with political and diplomatic matters, Abu Mazen must have known at least about some of the terrorist attacks carried out by the PLO against Israel, Jewish targets and Western targets.

One can assume that if he was an agent, he passed some of his knowledge on to the Soviets.

The KGB was a successful professional intelligence agency.

It managed to recruit and plant good agents in many Western countries, including the US and the UK. It also reached the Israeli top echelon, having agents in the Mossad, Shin Bet, IDF, the Foreign Ministry, the Ness Ziona Biological Institute and probably in other government ministries. It can be assumed that not all of them were caught by Israeli counter-intelligence.

One more interesting observation regards the intriguing relations between the Middle East and the world of espionage.  The KGB and its satellites were not alone in the game. The CIA and British and French intelligence agencies also went on fishing expeditions, and their catch was not bad at all.

Many Arab leaders were either paid agents or agents of influence for these services.

King Hussein, for example, was a paid agent of the CIA and also worked closely with British intelligence. And so were Syrian leaders in the 1950s and ‘60s. Even Ali Hassan Salameh, who was Arafat’s chief of security and responsible for the planning of the Munich Olympics massacre, turned out to be an asset for the CIA in Beirut. In 1979 Mossad operatives killed him in the Lebanese capital.

The Israeli intelligence community, Mossad and military intelligence didn’t stand idle.  The Israelis were also very successful in penetrating the Arab world and the PLO — recruiting leaders, top government officials, scientists and senior military officers. It is interesting to note that, during the Israeli-PLO negotiations in the ‘90s, it was revealed that the Mossad managed to plant a listening device in Abu Mazen’s desk in his office in Tunis.

September 8, 2016

Will Turkey Proceed with Repairing Relations with Israel — A Month After the Turkish Coup?

[This analysis by Yossi Melman, co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince and the new history of Israeli intelligence, Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, first appeared at MiddleEastEye.net.]

The failed coup in Turkey — exactly one month ago — and subsequent events are having a strong effect on Israeli-Turkish relations.  At this point, there is a complete freeze on the reconciliation process between the two countries.

Prime Minister Erdogan

Prime Minister Erdogan

The Turkish government is now focused on tightening its grip on society by persecuting and purging the military, intelligence and practically all other security and civilian structures of the state from its real or imaginary enemies.

Externally, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is preoccupied in stepping up Turkey’s war against the Kurds and mending his relations with Russia’s Putin.  His limited span of attention is excluding Israel.

“Nothing is happening on our front, for good and bad,” I was told by a senior source in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“At least we aren’t any longer bashed by Erdogan as he used to do.  And unlike the accusation levelled by the Turkish-controlled media against the US and the EU, Israel isn’t accused of any plots and involvement in the revolt.”

According to the source, “The relations are on hold and the agreement is not implemented; but on the other hand, we keep getting messages from Ankara that nothing has changed and that they are committed to the agreement.”

The Turkish parliament is set to vote on the deal before it goes into summer recess later this month, the country’s foreign minister said on Thursday – but what happens next is anyone’s best guess.

More than six years after the relations between the two countries deteriorated as a result of the tragic incidents of the Mavi Marmara, representatives of the two governments signed a reconciliation agreement at the end of June 2016 in a Rome hotel.

The Mavi Marmara was a Turkish boat which carried Turkish and international “peace” activists who wanted to break the Israeli siege and reach Gaza.  The ship was purchased in 2010 by IHH, a Turkish NGO active as a charity organization in more than 115 countries.

But Israeli intelligence sources claimed that IHH smuggled weapons on behalf of terrorist groups and had links to al-Qaeda. In 2010, the US State Department expressed great concern over the group’s links with senior Hamas officials.

In May 2010, while sailing on international waters enroute to Gaza, the boat was stopped by the Israeli navy.

For Israel, most of the passengers were terrorists or at least agents of provocation who were equipped with clubs, chains, and bats and came to cause trouble, not humanitarians.  A clash broke out, resulting in the death of nine Turkish citizens and the humiliation of one of Israel’s top commando units – Shayetet 13 (Flotilla 13).

The reconciliation agreement contains diplomatic, economic and security-related topics.  The most annoying clause from the Israeli side is the readiness is to pay $20 million to the Turkish families of the victims.

Here is some perspective: Israel reluctantly paid less to the victims’ families of the USS Liberty, a spy ship of the US’s National Security Agency which sailed near the Sinai Peninsula coastline during the 1967 war.  The Israeli Air Force mistook the Liberty for an enemy ship, attacked it and killed 34 crewmen.  (Relatives of the slain Americans and many Navy and NSA veterans believe that Israel did it intentionally.)

All in all, in 2016, it was Turkey that needed the agreement — much more than did Israel.

Erdogan’s foreign and security policies have failed completely since the bloody civil war in Syria began more than five years ago.  He announced that his policy would revolve around “zero” troubles with his neighbors.  Exactly the opposite has occurred: Turkey has found itself in disputes with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and with Russia, Iran, the Islamic State and Kurds at home and in Syria.

What Israel Got

Thus, the new deal contains some positive elements and advantages for Israel.

Turkey bent to Israeli pressure and agreed to shut down an office established by Izz A-Din Qassam, the military wing of Hamas.  From this office in Istanbul, as Israeli intelligence officials would later disclose in a briefing, Hamas operatives had issued orders, sent money and ran terror operatives in the occupied West Bank against Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

In 2015, the Israel Security Agency (ISA also known as Shin Bet) foiled a few attempts of these kinds, the largest almost a year ago, when dozens of Hamas members were arrested and caches of weapons found.

The orders were given personally by Salah al-Aruri, the Turkey-based Hamas commander who benefited from the personal protection of Hakan Fidan, the chief of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT).

To the agony of Fidan, Erdogan gave orders to expel Aruri already a few months ago.  Fidan doesn’t like Israel.  Over the past six years, he tried to avoid meeting his Mossad counterparts.  He seldom met Tamir Pardo, the former director of Mossad, and his successor, Yossi Cohen, and reduced the links between the two agencies to the minimum.

Mossad suspected that Fidan was pro-Iranian, and American intelligence sources accused him of informing Iran about an Israeli espionage ring operating on Iranian soil.  As a result, Iran’s authorities made arrests inside their country.

Another important success for the Israeli government is the fact that the siege of Gaza has not been lifted.  Unlike Erdogan’s claims and boasts, Turkish humanitarian aid to Gaza will be sent via the Israeli port of Ashdod.

There it will be inspected, making sure that indeed it is only humanitarian in nature – food, medications, toys – and transported by Israeli trucks like all supplies to Gaza.  One such shipment was sent by Turkey after the Rome agreement and days before the military rebellion.

There are also other security benefits for Israel which have been ignored or barely reported.  The Turkish parliament, for example, will pass laws that prohibit the suing of Israeli officers and officials involved in the Marmara incident in Turkish courts.  In recent years, a few Turkish courts issued warrants against senior Israeli officers.

Turkey has also promised not to oppose the inclusion of Israel in NATO events and in other international forums.

The History of the Covert Connections

The special security and intelligence ties between the two countries began in the second half of the 1950s.  Encouraged by the US and the UK, the intelligence communities of Israel (Mossad), Iran (Savak) and Turkey (MIT) established a tripartite consultative body known as the Trident alliance.

The intelligence chiefs of the three services met annually and exchanged information on common enemies – Egypt, Syria and Iraq.  The relations reached their peak in the 1950s, with Iran’s involvement ending after the country’s 1979 revolution.  Israeli-Turkish intelligence sharing continued through the first decade of the 21st century, peaking around 2005 and ending when Erdogan walked away.

Turkey became an important market worth several billion dollars for Israeli military and security goods.  Israeli security corporations sold drones, intelligence equipment and upgraded fighter planes and tanks for the Turkish army.

Turkey also fed Israel with information which it had obtained about Syria, Iraq and, to a degree, Iran from its spies and listening posts built by the US.  In return, Turkey asked for and got information obtained by Israeli intelligence on Kurdish organisations — especially the PKK.

Mossad officials met regularly with their MIT colleagues either in Ankara or Istanbul or in Tel Aviv.  During some of these sessions, senior MIT officials in charge of monitoring the PKK even felt at ease and close enough to ask their Israeli counterparts if they would be willing to help them to assassinate Kurdish terrorists.  The Israelis listened politely, usually didn’t comment and ignored the requests.

It all ended when then Turkish prime minister, now president, Erdogan changed the course of Turkish foreign policy and orientation.

It is clear to Israeli security officials that when the new agreement is implemented, the golden era of close, even intimate military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Turkey, will not return.

August 15, 2016

The Gaza War in 2014 — A Failure of Israeli Leadership, Or They Did the Best They Could?

[This analysis was written for The Jerusalem Post by Yossi Melman, co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince — and the current history of Israeli intelligence and security, Spies Against Armageddon (published by Levant Books).]

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not only concerned, he is worried and angry, which has led him to go on the offensive.

Netanyahu (government photo)

Netanyahu (government photo)

He is concerned by the request — by most of the bereaved families of Operation Protective Edge (50 out of 67) — to establish a commission of inquiry into how his government behaved, before and during the 2014 Gaza war.

In addition to this request, which came as a surprise to the prime minister, the state comptroller’s report on the war is expected to be published soon. A leaked draft of the report suggests that it will be critical of the government’s and the IDF’s preparations for the war.

Netanyahu and his aides fear that the bereaved families’ demand for an inquiry and the comptroller report will be used by ministers and MKs in the coalition and the opposition in order to attack him and undermine his authority and position, in particular when he also has a police investigation into corruption allegations hanging over his head.

Therefore, the prime minister held a nearly three-hour briefing with military reporters and analysts on short notice Monday. He laid out before us his strategic viewpoint on Israel’s situation, the challenges facing the country, the threats against it and its capabilities to face these threats.

However, the bulk of the conversation was spent on the prime minister’s attempts to deflect the bereaved families’ criticism. As a bereaved brother himself, Netanyahu understands how sensitive an issue it is to argue with such families and to thwart the comptroller report and similar criticism voiced by ministers such as Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman.

Convening the military correspondents was a smart move by Netanyahu. It was intended to give more “professional” weight to his claims than they would have had if they were conveyed through political or diplomatic correspondents.

The prime minister spoke at times with excitement and at times in anger, accompanied by fist-banging on the table. He presented data and quotes which sought to prove that the government, the cabinet and he personally took the Hamas tunnel threat seriously, as well as the group’s other military capabilities – rockets, naval commandos and aerial vehicles.

In the seven months prior to the war, between November 2013 and July 2014, the cabinet met eight times, almost a third of all of the forum’s meetings in that period, to discuss the tunnel threat. The prime minister also toured the frontlines and held discussions with Gaza division commanders. The cabinet heard situation reports from IDF commanders and senior Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) officials on the subject. At the conclusion of some of the meetings, decisions were made and orders were given, including by Netanyahu himself to the IDF and the defense establishment to prepare militarily for the tunnel threat and to develop technology to thwart it.

In these cabinet meetings, as well as in other forums, there was an intelligence-based estimate that Hamas had dug at least 20 tunnels into Israeli territory. In The Jerusalem Post’s sister publication, Ma’ariv Sofshavua, I published in October 2013 that the IDF had even estimated that there were some 30 tunnels (during Operation Protective Edge 31 tunnels were uncovered and destroyed). If I knew about the threat, then the IDF and the cabinet definitely knew about it.

Therefore, in this respect, the prime minister is right. The claims that the cabinet was not informed, or that the IDF did not know, are baseless. It is true that the defense establishment (and this is also Netanyahu’s responsibility) could have prepared better technologically and started to more quickly look for a solution if they would have listened years ago to the warnings of the geologist Col. (Res.) Yossi Langotsky. The solutions that are now being applied to the fight against tunnels are exactly what Langotsky suggested ten years ago, but nobody listened.

The prime minister, (and then-defense minister Moshe Ya’alon) managed the war in the correct manner – carefully and calmly, while setting reasonable goals that took into account an exit strategy for the war. Netanyahu’s strategy was to avoid mass casualties on the Israeli side and to minimize the harm done to the civilian population in Gaza, while delivering a harsh and painful blow to Hamas without agreeing to any of the group’s demands.

If the prime minister will be wise enough now to make the decision to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Gaza – the establishment of a seaport is the required step – chances are that the danger of another war will be pushed back several more years, and in retrospect, we will be able to say that Operation Protective Edge achieved good results for Israel.

 

 

July 30, 2016

If Turkey’s Erdogan Had Fallen, Israel Wouldn’t Weep, But…

[This analysis by Yossi Melman is based on an article he wrote for The Jerusalem Post on July 16, 2016, after it became clear that the attempted coup by elements of Turkey’s army failed — and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who recently restored normal relations with Israel after several frosty years, has survived.  Melman is co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince and of the current history of Israeli intelligence and security, Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars.]

The great irony in the coup attempt that failed in Turkey was obvious. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has tried for years to stifle the operating freedom of social networks and has accused them of being dark forces attempting to undermine his rule. It was these same social media networks which helped him to put down the coup.

Erdogan broadcast from his smartphone — using Apple’s FaceTime — a statement to the people. He tweeted to his supporters and relied on the media, even those whom he deathly hates, to spread his message in the critical first hours of the coup attempt when uncertainty gripped the country.

In this respect, the attempt was reminiscent of the failed coup by the national guard and the Greek military junta in 1974 against the rule of Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios III. Makarios succeeded in sending out a weak radio signal saying that he was alive. Voice of Israel radio monitor Miki Gordus received the signal and broadcast the message to the whole world. As a result of that failed coup, the Turkish army invaded and partitioned Cyprus into two parts.

In the case of Turkey, it seems that those involved – apparently relatively low-ranked officers – would not have succeeded in their operation even if Erdogan would not have been able to deliver his broadcast.

The rebellion initially appeared to be going by the book. The rebels gained control of the bridges over the Bosphorous Strait in Istanbul, which connect Europe and Asia, as well as major junctions. Pilots involved in the plot bombed the parliament building in Ankara, the MIT intelligence agency’s headquarters and some military strongpoints, including tanks near the presidential palace.

They even took control of the state-run TV station, TRT, and forced a remarkably poised female newscaster to read their statement that they had taken over the government to preserve democracy, to remove Erdogan, to suppress terrorism, and to change the Constitution.

However, it appears that the number of soldiers in their command – apparently a few thousand – was insufficient to complete the job.

How Pres. Erdogan Called on People to Defy the Coup

How Pres. Erdogan Called on People to Defy the Coup

In Turkey’s previous four military coups since 1960, tens of thousands of soldiers took part, if not the entire army. This time, the rebels kidnapped the chief of staff and a number of other senior commanders, who have since been freed, but most importantly they failed to capture Erdogan, who was vacationing at a Marble Lake resort. Capturing the Turkish leader was probably the first thing they should have done.

Erdogan succeeded in broadcasting his remarks to the people, calling on his supporters to take to the streets, and they answered his call. They blocked the rebel soldiers’ path and together with the police, which remained loyal to Erdogan, fought them and took many of them prisoner.

The masses taking to the streets was reminiscent of the attempted coup by a group of Soviet officials in August 1991 against President Michael Gorbachev — in the hopes of preventing the fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. That rebellion was put down because of the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, who was then the head of the Russian Federation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was dismantled in the wake of the coup attempt.

Turkey has previously experienced four military coups. According to the Constitution, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the army is the defender of democracy.

Anytime that the military commanders believed that the civilian leadership was straying from the constitution, they did not hesitate to carry out a coup, take rule into their own hands and eventually put a democratic government back in place.

For years now, there has been disillusionment within the army and the secular public with Erdogan, the leader of the Islamist AKP party. As prime minister and elected president he instituted a dictatorship in the hopes of establishing himself as a 21st century sultan, while increasing the influence of religion in the public sphere. This is also the reason that Erdogan purified institutions in the state and instituted changes within them to strengthen his hold on power.

He put his loyalists in key positions in Turkey’s intelligence agency, police, justice system, education system and the army. He harassed the media, trying to take it over and marginalized business leaders who he saw as hostile to the throne.

It can be assumed that now, with the defeat of the coup attempt, he will immediately increase his efforts to strengthen his hold on power and oppress his opponents. His supporters are already accusing his arch rival Fethullah Gulen, a powerful cleric who lives in exile in the U.S., of organizing the rebellion. Gulen has denied involvement, but that will not stop Erdogan from  persecuting Gulen’s supporters.

In Turkey, conspiracy theories that Erdogan himself planned the coup in order to make himself stronger are even being voiced.

Despite the fact that the U.S. and most members of NATO, to which Turkey belongs, condemned the coup and voiced support for Erdogan and the elected government, there is no doubt that there is increasing concern among them about instability in the country.

For months, Turkey has been subject to an onslaught of terror from Turkish Kurds and ISIS (the so-called Islamic State in neighboring Syria feeling that he betrayed them after secretly aiding them for years).

The war on terror hurts tourism and the economy, and now the coup attempt is liable to throw one of the most important countries in the Middle East into a period of uncertainty and disquiet.

As for Israel, which just recently signed a reconciliation deal with Turkey, the failure of the coup will not affect relations between the countries and the status quo will continue.

However, it can be assumed that the Israeli government, the defense establishment and the intelligence community would not have shed a tear if the coup had succeeded, Erdogan had been ousted and the army had taken power.

July 16, 2016

Israel and Turkey Restore Relations: Key Goal is a Cooperative Trio with Egypt

[Yossi Melman, co-author of the best seller on Israeli espionage and security, Every Spy a Prince, and the current book Spies Against Armageddon, wrote this for The Jerusalem Post in early March.  Today (June 27), Israel and Turkey are announcing the restoration of diplomatic relations after long, difficult negotiations.  What’s likely to happen now?]

Even if Israel and Turkey soon announce an end to their diplomatic crisis, which began almost six years ago as a result of the Mavi Marmara flotilla ship incident, relations between the two countries will not go back to how they once were.

The golden era of cooperation in the security and intelligence fields between the two countries up until a decade ago will certainly not come back. 

Turkey was a large and important market for Israel’s security industries, which provided drones, intelligence systems, tank and planes upgrades, and more. For years, there was close cooperation between the Mossad and Turkey’s intelligence agency, the MIT, which included meetings, an exchange of each countries’ situational assessments and more.

This cooperation began in 1958 with the initiation of an intelligence pact between Iran’s SAVAK, under the Shah, the Mossad and Turkish intelligence. The codename in Israel for this pact was “Clil” (Complete).

Prime Minister Erdogan

Prime Minister Erdogan

These intimate relations were ended by Recep Tayyip Erdogan when he rose to power in 2002, first as prime minister, and currently as president. It was a gradual process that deteriorated after the Marmara incident. However, the 2010 flotilla was merely a symptom of a deeper issue. Yet, despite the security and intelligence disconnect and the diplomatic crisis, both commercial and tourism ties did grow under Erdogan.

The initiative for a turnaround in relations has come from Ankara … Erdogan’s foreign and defense policies have failed miserably. He saw himself as the renewer of the days of the Ottoman Empire and as a modern-day, 21st century Sultan. He aimed to turn Turkey into a regional power, and perhaps into the strongest force in the Middle East, but this did not happen.

Instead, Turkey finds itself in a conflict with Russia and Iran over Syria, where Erdogan hoped to see President Bashar Assad ousted. Erdogan supported the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and now he finds himself at odds with Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Because of Turkey’s uncompromising fight against its Kurdish population, as well as in Syria and Iraq, Ankara is also losing its influence with NATO and with the U.S.

 Turkey is now more isolated than ever and is therefore interested in renewing ties with Israel, in the hope that the Jewish state can help Ankara improve its standing in Washington. Turkey also needs natural gas from Israel in order to diversify its sources of energy and to reduce its dependency on Russian gas.

Most of the disagreements between Israel and Turkey stemming from the Marmara incident have already been rectified. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized for the incident in which nine Turkish citizens were killed. Israel has already made clear that it is prepared to pay some $25 million in compensation to the families of the victims. Turkey has deported senior Hamas military wing official Salah Aruri from the country and has tightened its supervision of the organization’s members at Israel’s request. Ankara has also agreed to institute special legislation that will prevent IDF commanders from standing trial for the Marmara incident.

However, the bigger problem to be solved is connected to Hamas in Gaza. Turkey is looking for a foothold in the Strip.  [The Israeli government view is that] Erdogan broke the rules, and therefore he bears the responsibility for rectifying the situation. Egypt’s Sisi as well is not prepared to easily forgive and grant Erdogan a prize for his behavior, as if nothing happened.

If the golden formula is found, and the crisis is indeed solved, it will be part of a three-way deal: Israel-Egypt-Turkey, in which the strategic alliance with Egypt is much more important to Israel than rehabilitating ties with Turkey.

June 27, 2016

U.S. Prepared Huge Cyber-Attack on Iran, In Case Israel Bombed Iran and a War Started

In his latest documentary, “Zero Days,” the award-winning Alex Gibney reveals that the Obama Administration believed an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities — which seemed in 2012 to be a very real prospect — would draw the United States into war.  To prepare, the NSA created a set of cyberattacks — code named “Nitro Zeus” — which could have crippled Iranian industry, transport, and other modern services.  

“Zero Days” was the opening feature of the AFI Docs festival in Washington, DC, on June 22.  Gibney was interviewed by Dan Raviv for the CBS News Weekend Roundup radio magazine; and Yossi Melman is seen in the film as an expert commenting on Israeli motivations in confronting Iran’s nuclear program.  Melman also credited in the film as a consultant.

Raviv and Melman are co-authors of five books, including the current history of Israeli intelligence — Spies Against Armageddon.

Here is part of an article Melman wrote for The Jerusalem Post in February 2016, when the documentary was first screened at the Berlin Film Festival.

Michael Hayden, former head of both the CIA and the NSA, is in the film and claims the goal of a potential Israeli strike on Iran would be to drag the U.S. into war.  The film also quotes other sources in the US intelligence community who accuse Israel of disrupting a joint covert operation to sabotage computers used in Iran’s nuclear program by acting rashly and in opposition to agreed-upon plans.  As a result, hundreds of millions of dollars that were invested in the operation went to waste.
A graphic from the documentary "Zero Days"

A graphic from the documentary “Zero Days”

The film contains testimony from NSA and CIA operatives who worked together with Israeli colleagues – from the 8200 Military Intelligence Unit and Mossad – to develop several versions of a deadly virus that penetrated computers at the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in Iran. The testimony is delivered anonymously by an actress whose face remains hidden.

According to the claims in the film, the hasty Israeli action prevented the carrying out of a number of further planned actions that were intended to sabotage computers at a second, more fortified uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. The film also reveals another planned cyber unit covert operation code-named NZ (Nitro Zeus).

“We spent millions on this operation to sabotage all of the computers of the Iranian infrastructure in the instance of a war,” a source quoted in the film said. “We penetrated the government, electricity lines, power stations and most of the infrastructure in Iran.”

 
The deadly virus that was implanted at Natanz was named “Stuxnet” by computer security experts, but it had a different name among the Israeli and American intelligence communities: “Olympic Games” — as revealed by New York Times’ journalist David E. Sanger.
Conventional wisdom holds that the implanting of the virus marked the first time that a country, or two countries in this case (the U.S. and Israel), engaged in cyber warfare against another country (Iran). Up until then, the majority of attacks were carried out by individual hackers for their own enjoyment or for political purposes, by criminals for the purposes of fraud and thievery, or by companies engaged in industrial and commercial espionage.
Vice President Joe Biden is quoted in the film as saying in a meeting that the Israelis “changed the code” of the deadly virus’s software.  As a result, the virus spread from nuclear program computers to many other computers in Iran, and from there to computers around the world — even harming the computers of American companies.
The unplanned spread of the virus led to the exposure of the operation and enabled the Iranians, with the help of information security experts from Belarus and Russia, to invent a “vaccine” for their computers to better defend the nuclear program.

According to the film, the premature exposure of the operation caused by Israel’s action’s also caused the virus software, which was among the most classified and most advanced in the world, to leak to Russian and Iranian intelligence.

“Ironically,” it is said in the film, “the secret formula for writing the code for the virus software fell into the hands of Russia and Iran – the country against which it was developed.”

June 23, 2016

Hezbollah’s Military Chief, Killed in Syria — By Whom? Many Enemies, Israel Among Them

[This post is adapted from an article for The Jerusalem Post by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars and other books.]

The circumstances of Hezbollah “Defense Minister” Mustafa Badreddine’s death are shrouded in mystery, as was most of his life in the underground. Hezbollah released an official statement on Saturday, saying that he was assassinated a few days ago by Syrian rebels near the Damascus airport.

This was startlingly different from previous assassinations of senior Hezbollah commanders.  The Lebanese Shi’ite group used to always — like a habitual reflex — blame Israel.

The official announcement seemed to clear Israel of responsibility for killing Badreddine — a mere eight years after his brother-in-law and powerful predecesssor, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in Damascus.  The Mughniyeh killing was the result of a joint Israeli-U.S. intelligence operation, according to several sources, although neither government has acknowledged liquidating one of their most virulent enemies.

True, Arab media did quote a Hezbollah politician in Lebanon — as well as several former Iranian generals — as saying “the rebels” are working under the orders of “the Zionists.”  But all in all, it is clear that Hezbollah does not wish to escalate its war against Israel — not at this time.

It remains unclear how Badreddine was killed.  There are reports that he died in an artillery blast, and others which claim he was hit by a missile, and even some reports that the missile was fired from an airplane.  In any event, it is clear that those who planned and carried out the assassination had precise intelligence information.

Hezbollah Issued This Photo of Badreddine After His Mysterious, Violent Death

Hezbollah Issued This Photo of Badreddine After His Mysterious, Violent Death

Israel did not officially comment on who might have killed Badreddine, but politicians in the government in Jerusalem tried to add an air of mystery by acting as though the whole matter is too delicate to say anything about.

The United States government did state it was not involved in the Hezbollah leader’s death.

Yet it is strange that no one claimed responsibility for the killing — not even one of the Sunni Muslim rebel groups in Syria.

The list of those who wanted Badreddine eliminated was long.  In addition to the U.S., Israel, and Syrian rebels, the governments of France, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others must be glad that one of the most cruel and wanted terrorists in the world is dead.

The possibility has also been raised that he was killed by one of his rivals within Hezbollah, but that is most likely disinformation being spread by some intelligence agency’s psychological warfare department.

However, it is reputed that Badreddine did have some sharp arguments with other senior Hezbollah commanders in recent years — as the Lebanese Shi’ites increasingly sustained losses in the Syrian civil war, obviously ordered by their Iranian paymasters to plunge into that war with gusto.

Badreddine is also said to have had disagreements with the Iranian Al-Quds Force, led by General Qassem Soleimani, who practically is in charge of Shi’ite militias and violent organizations around the world.  These arguments developed because of Badreddine’s operational ideas — which seemed to border on crazy hallucinations; as well as a reckless lifestyle that seemed to emulate his hero, the assassinated Mughniyeh.

Yet it has not been the practice of Hezbollah and Iran to settle accounts within their own ranks, within “the family,” so to speak, by liquidating non-conformists.

In rare cases, Hezbollah and Iran have put people on trial for espionage or treason — and those cases naturally ended in executions.  Yet in cases of disobedience, Hezbollah men are simply stripped of their positions.

It also would not make sense for Iran and Hezbollah to get rid of one of their most important commanders, right in the middle of a crucial stage in Syria’s civil war.  Three years ago, Hezbollah sent 6,000 combatants to fight the rebels — in order to save the Bashar al-Assad regime, an objective later backed emphatically by Russia’s military.

Killing Badreddine would require Hezbolla to replace him with a less experienced commander.

So who did it?  Similar to the outcome (spoiler alert!) of Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, it is even conceivable that all of Badreddine’s foes — or an unusual group of them — teamed up to find him and eliminate him.

Israel may have had a hand in that.  Or not.  But further weakening of Hezbollah’s capabilities and morale is certainly a good thing for Israel’s strategy.

 

 

 

May 15, 2016

“Ready for a Challenge?” Job Ads Placed by Mossad — Looking for Cyber Aces

[This post is based on an article in Hebrew by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars and other books, in the newspaper Maariv.]

The Mossad — Israel’s famed foreign intelligence agency — placed unusual advertisements in several Israeli newspapers on Wednesday.  It is not the first time that the Mossad published “want ads,” announcing that jobs are available for the right men and women.  This one also seems to be polishing the secret agency’s image as a cutting-edge, entirely modern and exciting place to work.

Mossad ready for challengeThe ad shows rows of numbers, apparently meant to represent computer code on a screen — and among the digits are English letters that read: “ARE YOU READY FOR A CHALLENGE?”

At the bottom, in Hebrew, is the official symbol of the Mossad — with its motto quoting the Bible: “Where there is no counsel, the nation falls; but there is salvation in a multitude of counsel.”  (Proverbs 11:14)

And intriguingly at the bottom is — apparently — the name of the Mossad department looking for brilliant employees: “The Operational Cyber Arm.”

The agency’s website also invites job applications.

Mossad.gov.il came into existence only about 15 years ago.  In part that was part of a new wave of relative openness: acknowledging that the Mossad exists and making it legal to publish the name of its director (Yossi Cohen this year replaced Tamir Pardo).  Also, the website is part of a recruitment effort — in Hebrew, English, Russian, Arabic, and Farsi (Persian) — which suggests that working for Israeli intelligence can give a person amazing experiences.

It was also, in the past 10 to 15 years, that the Mossad — instructed by Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert — stepped up its efforts to derail and sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.

 

May 11, 2016

The Secrecy-Shrouded Nuclear Reactor at Dimona — It Might Have to Close in 7 Years

[This article is based on an item written for The Jerusalem Post by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars and other books on Israeli defense, intelligence, and culture.]

A moment of truth for Israel’s nuclear policy is nearing. Haim Levinson’s article in Ha’aretz (in Hebrew on April 26) regarding the defects in the core of the nuclear reactor in Dimona only emphasizes this fact.

Such reactors are normally taken out of service after 40 years or so. Ultrasound examinations found 1,537 flaws in the metal core in Dimona, a scientist from the facility reported — according to Levinson in Ha’aretz.

These are not defects that can develop to the level of large cracks, that would at this stage cause nuclear radiation emission from the reactor and endanger the surrounding population and environment.

Israel Atomic Energy Commission logo pngThe awareness of these flaws — and the likelihood of how they would progress — were known since the inception of the nuclear reactor. In 2004 similar findings were revealed at a symposium at Ben Gurion University in Beersheba, where senior officials of the Atomic Energy Commission, which is responsible for the reactor in Dimona, admitted that they were encountering difficulties in upgrading the safety of the reactor.

The reactor in Dimona — which France built for Israel — began to function in 1963. According to the manufacturer’s standards, the lifetime of reactors of this type is forty years.

At that convention 12 years ago, the CEO of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission — Gideon Frank — said that in the United States, techniques were developed that allowed for a 20-year extension of the lifetime of reactors.

However, the reactor core, which is made from metal and wrapped with a thick layer of concrete that defends against the tremendous radiation from within, cannot be replaced, as there is a leaking water heater there that cannot be fixed.

Today, the reactor in Dimona is 53 years old and has repeatedly received “anti-aging treatment.”

Israel used the most advanced techniques in the world, but they will be effective until when? If we rely on the words of Gideon Frank from the convention, then the reactor has another seven years to its life. By then there will be no alternative but to disable the reactor.

The technological problems create a huge dilemma for the longtime Israeli strategy of deterrence. The reactor that Israel acquired from France, had, according to foreign reports, a 24-megawatt capacity and was to be used for research purposes. According to these same sources Israel increased its output to 50 megawatts, possibly even more.

According to foreign reports, since its activation, Israel’s reactor has been manufacturing uranium and plutonium. Those are the fissile materials for the construction of nuclear weapons. These reports said that the proponents of Israeli nuclear development believed that nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent and secure Israel’s existence for generations.

Concurrently, they also formulated the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity, which neither admitted nor denied the existence of nuclear weapons.

In my opinion, the brilliance and boldness of the Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity proved and continues to prove itself strategically.

The success of this policy is evident in the fact that no superpower has demanded of Israel to disarm nuclear capacity, which the world claims Israel has.

However the policy of nuclear ambiguity also prevents Israel from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which bans the production, stockpiling and spread of nuclear weapons.

This is the predicament in which Israel exists today. Israel does not possess the ability and the materials to build a new reactor and is in need of foreign or international assistance. If Israel were to sign the NPT it would be able to receive nuclear reactors for the purpose of research and generation of electricity, but it would also be mandated that Israel disclose everything it has.

The foreign reports indicated that during the years of its reactor’s operation, Israel constructed approximately 200 nuclear bombs of all types and sizes as well as the means to launch them, according to one report. According to another more recent report, Israel is in possession of “only” 80 bombs.

This substantial arsenal could continue to ensure Israel’s deterrence policy, even if the reactor were to close and could not manufacture additional bomb-making materials. But the gleaming dome of the reactor is also a symbol of Israel and its nuclear capability.

Israel will try to extend the lifespan of the reactor as much as possible before its inevitable expiration, when the efficacy of the “anti-aging” remedies will also expire.

May 8, 2016

Oil, Intelligence, Suicide Drone — Israel’s Hush-Hush Relations with Azerbaijan (Bordering Iran)

[This post is adapted from an article written for The Jerusalem Post by Yossi Melman, co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince and the current history of Israel’s intelligence agencies, Spies Against Armageddon.]

The longtime head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, who died of cancer on March 17, was known to be a great traveler.  Years ago he went on a journey to central Asia and visited Azerbaijan.  Knowing that he was an avid chess player and “not a bad one” — as he once put it — his hosts  took him to a local chess club.  Dagan had the heady experience of playing simultaneously against a group of teenagers.  He lost to all of them.

His Azeri hosts (apparently counterparts in security agencies, but they have not been identified) felt embarrassed.  They did not want an honored guest from such a friendly country, Israel, to be humiliated.

Israel, the Jewish state, is indeed considered a good friend to the Muslim, former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan.  Diplomatic relations were established in 1992, only a few months after Azeri independence was achieved with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Relations are excellent, and the improvement has been based on shared strategic interests.  The two countries are getting even closer, against the background of renewed violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia, another former Soviet republic.  They are fighting over a district, Nagorno Karabakh, where civilians caught in the middle are again suffering death and destruction.

Azerbaijan’s forces have been noticed using Israel-made weapons.

The two nations are certainly an odd couple.  The Azeris are predominantly Shiite Muslims, and while they vote in elections they do not truly have a Western democracy.  The country has been run since 1991 by a single family, which is accused of corruption and suppressing independent media.  Investigative journalists have been harassed and jailed there.

The CIA's Map of Azerbaijan: Nestled Among Strategic Neighbors

The CIA’s Map of Azerbaijan: Nestled Among Strategic Neighbors

Israel, however, has a long record of not being too picky in choosing its undemocratic friends — certainly not when it comes to weapons sales and other national interests.  A quick look at the map can explain Israel’s priorities.  Azerbaijan has borders with four countries including Iran — Israel’s most dangerous enemy.  The capital, Baku, is on the Caspian Sea — which affords interesting ways to get in and out.  Azerbaijan is a major oil producer and invests 5 percent of its GDP in its military.

IAI Harop drone bomb

Israel’s Harop, Displayed for Sale

According to foreign reports, The Mossad runs a big station in Azerbaijan taking advantage of the geography. Iranian spokespersons have accused their neighbor of allowing Israeli intelligence to carry out — from Azeri territory — espionage missions in Iran which include recruiting and planting agents, communications interception, and aerial reconnaissance. More than a year ago, Iran claimed to have shot down an Israeli drone.  Israeli officials have refused to comment on such reports.

Yet it was President Ilham Aliyev himself who was quoted in a cable — published by WikiLeaks — sent from the U.S. Embassy in Baku, as saying: “Bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Israel are like an iceberg. Nine-tenths are below the surface.”

Another WikiLeaks document from 2007 showed more frankness and openness expressed by Arthur Lenk, then the Israeli ambassador in Baku (now serving in South Africa).  He told the U.S. ambassador that the two countries have a security agreement and that one of Aliyev’s assistants — during a visit to Israel — met with Israel’s deputy defense minister and “Mossad officials.”

In 2009 Azeri security services exposed a joint plot designed by an Iranian intelligence agency and Hezbollah to target the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community in Baku.  That would have been part of their attempt to take revenge for the killing, a year earlier, of Imad Mughniyeh — the “defense minister” in charge of Hezbollah operations.  The car bomb that killed Mughniyeh in Damascus was attributed to the Mossad, and recently a CIA role in the assassination was reliably reported.

Tips from the Mossad to their Azeri counterparts in 2009 foiled the conspiracy in Baku and led to the arrest of several suspects, while others managed to escape to Iran.

The joint combat against terrorism is just one glue strengthening the relations between Azerbaijan and Israel.  Another sign of the prosperous allience can be seen in the annual trade. which is currently $5 billion, more than the total trade between Israel and France.

The details are not fully revealed, but it consists most of Azeri oil sold to Israel — and Israelis weapons and intelligence technologies purchased by Azerbaijan.  The best promoters of the military sales and ties have been Israeli defense minister and officials who have visited the Caucasian nation.  Most recently it was the current minister, Moshe (Boogie) Ya’alon, who went to Baku in Otober 2014 to meet with his counterpart — and even with President Aliyev.

The security and intelligence ties began modestly. In the 1990s Israel sold light weapons, mortars, and ammunition worth a few millions of dollars.  In addition, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI, now renamed Israel Aerospace Industries) maintained the aircraft fleet of Azerbaijan Airlines.

Israel Aerospace Industries Exports the Harop: a Drone Bomb

Israel Aerospace Industries Exports the Harop: a Drone Bomb

In recent years, according to foreign reports, the volume expanded to billions.  That made Azerbaijan the second biggest market in Asia, after India, for Israeli weapons.

According to the French newsletter “Intelligence on Line,” Israeli sales include drones, ground stations, control and command posts, and advanced intelligence equipment.

It was also reported that IAI was the first bidder to offer Azerbaijan a spy satellite valued at $150 million — plus the ground station and the launching cost.  U.S., French, and Russian compaanies later joined the bidding, but experts assume that the Israeli company has the best chance of winning the contract because of IAI’s long-standing, intimate contacts with Azerbaijan.

The French publication also reported that Haifa-based Israel Shipyards has an advantage over its French and other competitors to build 12 light vessels for the Azeri coast guard.

This month the Washington Post gave the world a narrow peek into the mostly secret relationship by publishing a video and photos of an Israel-made “suicidal drone,” flying over the frontlines of the civil war in Nagorno-Karabakh — reportedly exploding itself onto a bus carrying Armenian combatants.  Seven people were killed, and the Armenian government protested to Israel.

The drone, called “Harop.” is just one model in a line of products that are hybrids of drones, missiles and bombs.   They can carry cameras and be recalled back to ground by their operator but also are equipped with up to 20 kilograms of explosive which the operator can lead to collide with the target and detonate it .

This past week, a few days after the incident, Israeli military journalists visited IAI facilities and were briefed on the various products from drones to satellites which the company has to offer.  An IAI spokeswoman was asked if the company was behind the Washington Post publication.  She refused to answer, but she clearly smiled when one reporter commented that such photos and video are good for business.   They promote sales which can be labeled “battle proven.”

April 16, 2016

Israel and Jordan: Air Forces Patrol Jointly, Confronted Russian Warplanes — Secrets from King Abdullah

[This blog is written by Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, whose current book is Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars.  In 1989, they revealed decades of Israeli-Jordanian contacts and cooperation in their book, Behind the Uprising.]

Jordan’s King Abdullah gave private briefings to members of America’s Congress in January.  That is rather routine.  But apparently detailed notes leaked out, recently, and among other things the depth of Jordan-Israeli military cooperation — and strategic alignment — is revealed.

David Hearst, longtime journalist for The Guardian in Britain, published excerpts at his Middle East Eye site.   (Click here for one of Hearst’s articles on the revelations.)

Abdullah of Jordan w troops 2008He writes that the king told about a midair confrontation between Russian planes — which intentionally were straying southwest of Syria’s border to test Israel’s air defenses — and Israeli and Jordanian F-16 jets which operated together.  Abdullah said: “The Russians were shocked and understood they cannot mess with us.”

Israel and Jordan have had diplomatic relations ever since signing their peace treaty in 1994.

Abdullah told the members of Congress that he has spoken about Syria with Russia’s government and feels that he is speaking “on behalf of Israel.”  He coordinates his positions with the director of Israel’s espionage agency, the Mossad.

That fits in with the Mossad’s traditional role as an alternative foreign ministry, when there are missions that don’t easily fit the daily duties of Israel’s official diplomats.

Abdullah did mention a significant disagreement he has with Israel.  He wants the Al-Nusra Front, considered an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Syria, to be bombed by the Russians.  Israel, however, sees some positive value in Al-Nusra as an enemy of Hezbollah (the Lebanon-based Shi’ite organization directed by Iran and involved in fighting in Syria).

The king said Russia’s president Vladimir Putin has genuine reasons to want to destroy Islamic terrorists — such as the bomb that blew up a Russian airliner over Egypt’s Sinai last year — adding that Putin listens to Jordan’s advice 90 percent of the time.

 

April 3, 2016

Our Revelation: The Mossad Recruited a Famous Nazi Colonel — Who Became a Hit-Man for Israel

[This is the beginning of our article, written for The Forward newspaper, revealing the Israel used Otto Skorzeny as an agent — and what the famous Nazi Waffen-SS colonel did for the Jewish State.]

On September 11, 1962, a German scientist vanished. The basic facts were simple: Heinz Krug had been at his office, and he never came home.+

Skorzeny Special Missions book coverThe only other salient detail known to police in Munich was that Krug commuted to Cairo frequently. He was one of dozens of Nazi rocket experts who had been hired by Egypt to develop advanced weapons for that country.+

One Israeli newspaper surprisingly claimed to have the explanation: The Egyptians kidnapped Krug to prevent him from doing business with Israel.+

But that somewhat clumsy leak was an attempt by Israel to divert investigators from digging too deeply into the case — not that they ever would have found the 49-year-old scientist.+

We can now report — based on interviews with former Mossad officers and with Israelis who have access to the Mossad’s archived secrets from half a century ago — that Krug was murdered as part of an Israeli espionage plot to intimidate the German scientists working for Egypt.+

Moreover, the most astounding revelation is the Mossad agent who fired the fatal gunshots: Otto Skorzeny, one of the Israeli spy agency’s most valuable assets, was a former lieutenant colonel in Nazi Germany’s Waffen-SS and one of Adolf Hitler’s personal favorites among the party’s commando leaders. The Führer, in fact, awarded Skorzeny the army’s most prestigious medal, the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, for leading the rescue operation that plucked his friend Benito Mussolini out from the hands of his captors.+Skorzeny scar book cover

Key to understanding the story is that the Mossad had made stopping German scientists then working on Egypt’s rocket program one of its top priorities. For several months before his death, in fact, Krug, along with other Germans who were working in Egypt’s rocket-building industry, had received threatening messages. When in Germany, they got phone calls in the middle of the night, telling them to quit the Egyptian program. When in Egypt, some were sent letter bombs — and several people were injured by the explosions.+

Krug, as it happens, was near the top of the Mossad’s target list.

[Read the rest at: http://forward.com/news/336943/ht/]

April 1, 2016

“There Was Something Sexy about How the Mossad Approached the Nazi Colonel — Like Wife Swapping or a Couples Game”

Dan Raviv, a CBS News correspondent who is co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, was interviewed on “The World,” a radio co-production of PRI and the BBC, by host Marco Werman.

Their 5-minute chat included a retelling of the “sexy” recruitment of former Waffen-SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny by the Mossad in 1962 in Madrid.

PRI banner The WorldRaviv and Yossi Melman, in an article for Forward, revealed this week that Skorzeny became an agent — and even an assassin — for Israel’s intelligence agency.

Here is the audio, from “The World”:

March 30, 2016

BBC and British Papers Fascinated by (Our) Revelation: A Famous Nazi was an Agent and Assassin for the Mossad

Our article appeared in the Forward weekly newspaper this past weekend, and on-line (click here).

We have learned that Otto Skorzeny — a daring commando officer in the Waffen-SS who was a favorite of Adolf Hitler — was recruited by the Mossad in 1962 and carried out assignments for Israeli intelligence.

Why would he do that?  And didn’t the Israelis feel moral qualms about employing a Nazi — to pursue, locate, and even kill Nazis?

That issue fascinates many in the global media.

Click here for Yossi Melman’s interview with BBC World Service’s Dan Damon — heard in the 5 a.m. hour across America on Wednesday.

Here is another of the interviews we have done since the weekend: This one, on BBC Radio 4’s The World Tonight:

March 30, 2016

Israel’s Mossad Recruited a Famous Nazi to Find and Attack Other Nazis: A Tale of Media Repeats

This past weekend, the weekly Forward newspaper — famous as a progressive Jewish news source for many decades — ran our article about Otto Skorzeny, who was one of Hitler’s favorite military officers.  We reveal that during his postwar years living in Spain and Ireland, he worked for Israel’s Mossad.

For some reason, he seemed to take pleasure in being a secret agent for the Jewish state’s famed and feared spy agency.

Our article (click here) suggests some reasons he would do it — as well as discussing the debate within the Mossad about the morality of employing a Nazi.

Meanwhile, we were surprised (and generally pleased) to see our story repeated and reported in news media around the globe.  But some of the repeats gave credit to the Israeli newspaper (and website) Haaretz.

It turns out that Haaretz has an arrangement with Forward to run some of that New York-based newspaper’s features.

On Tuesday, the German newspaper Bild told our story — with our exclusive details about Otto Skorzeny and his Mossad handlers — but cited only the Israeli paper Haaretz.

Come to think of it, Bild didn’t see fit to mention our names — or Forward.

Oh — and the respected British newspaper, the Daily Telegraph?  They also didn’t notice, apparently, on the Haaretz site that the story was from Forward.com.   They just credited Haaretz, as though that Israeli paper unearthed this historical nugget.

Nor did the Telegraph see fit to mention our names.

That’s part of how the modern media’s echo chamber works, in circulating, repeating, and sometimes distorting or amplifying stories.

March 29, 2016

Terrorism in Brussels — An Israeli Perspective

[This analysis is adapted from an article written by Yossi Melman for The Jerusalem Post.  In addition, Dan Raviv‘s 43-minute radio special on the March 22 terrorism in Brussels — and his interviews with pundits and experts on terrorism — can be heard by clicking here.]

TEL AVIV – There are eleven security and inspection points at Ben-Gurion Airport. They spread from a roadblock at the airport entrance, through the security checkpoints that all travelers expect, all the way to the gates where passengers board their flights.

That is a lot to do – involving plenty of personnel and other expense – but Israel considers it a necessary investment.  Lives must be saved, and the travel industry must not be destroyed by bloodshed.

The multi-layered security is affordable — not just because Tel Aviv’s international airport is relatively small, but also because of a holistic security doctrine engraved by nearly 50 years of experience marked by blood and tears.

Since some early tragic failures, Israel has improved and upgraded its security measures on land and in the air. For decades, security experts from international airlines, police forces and security agencies have come here to learn Israeli know-how and doctrines.
Unfortunately, the non-Israelis stand up and take notice only after spectacular terrorist attacks — such as the 1988 Pan Am bombing and 9/11.

It took Western democracies a while to reach the conclusion that human life is at least as important as human rights. Most probably it will happen this time, too.

Three Muslim Bombers at Brussels Airport: The Man in the White Jacket Fled

Three Muslim Bombers at Brussels Airport: The Man in the White Jacket Fled

Sure, there is no hermetically sealed security, and terrorists will always take advantage of gaps. But there is no need to be a genius to understand that what happened in Brussels this week was a colossal security and intelligence failure.

Belgian authorities admit that they knew there was a high probability of an “imminent terror attack.” Yet neither the country’s police nor its security forces increased their presence in the streets or by adding checkpoints at the entrances to the airport. No wonder three terrorists managed to enter with suitcases heavily laden with explosives, screws, and bolts. Two blew themselves up, within a minute of each other; and it was lucky that the third man lost his nerve and fled.

The Brussels tragedy – with more than 30 people murdered and almost 300 wounded – was the result of years of negligence.

For decades, Belgium’s police have been afraid to enter rough Muslim neighborhoods such as Molenbeek, in the capital. These areas first became havens for criminal gangs dealing in drugs, protection, and weapons. Then they turned into hotbeds of radical Muslim and anti-Western trends.

In recent decades, such neighborhoods across Europe have become fertile recruiting grounds for young Muslims attracted by the slogans of jihadist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, or known by the Arabic acronym Da’esh).

Now, radicalized Muslims – hundreds and potentially thousands of them – are returning from the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields.

They are ideologically hardened and militarily trained. “For a terrorist,” former CIA deputy director Michael Morell says, “there is no better training than actually fighting in a war.”

To gather intelligence, security agencies need to penetrate terrorist networks, recruit agents, and intercept communications.

It seems that the Belgian police were either afraid or reluctant, or they lacked the determination to take the necessary steps. Perhaps all of these. These years of negligence resulted in a reality for which the Belgian public – and the world – pay the price.

Belgium’s security services lack necessary intelligence. The writing was on the wall for a long time. Since 9/11 – and then atrocities in Madrid, London, Turkey, Bali and more – the international community should have come to realize that it is at war.

Some measures were taken, but the leaders of major countries – and security agencies – were slow, even reluctant, to draw the necessary conclusions.

Islamic State surely puts its highest priority on maintaining and growing its “caliphate” straddling the Iraq-Syria border.  But the group also seems determined to strike cities in Western countries.  Some say that began only after the West started attacking ISIS.  But exporting terrorism – and sending Muslim extremist recruits back to their home countries – was always going to be part of the ISIS playbook.

March 23, 2016

Meir Dagan, Mossad Chief 2002 to 2010, has Died — A Strong Voice for Hitting Iran Quietly, and Keeping America Friendly

Meir Dagan, the head of Israel’s espionage service Mossad from 2002 through the end of 2010, has died at age 71.   He had been battling cancer — the one enemy that he could not outwit and outrun.  

Yossi Melman, co-author of Every Spy a Prince and the current history of Israeli intelligence, Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, looks back at Dagan’s career — and his role as the key architect of secret sabotage aimed at Iran’s nuclear program.

On Thursday morning, after learning that retired General Meir Dagan had died, the current Mossad chief Yossi Cohen expressed — on behalf of the organization’s employees and its past chiefs — deep sorrow at the news of his death and sent condolences to the Dagan family.

Meir Dagan appeared on CBS's 60 Minutes (with Lesley Stahl) after his retirement

Meir Dagan appeared on CBS’s 60 Minutes (with Lesley Stahl) after his retirement

Dagan, the tenth “Ramsad” (Rosh ha-Mossad, meaning Head of the Institution), was appointed by his close friend Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and served atop the organization from 2002 until December 2010.

He is most identified with clandestine operations to prevent and thwart Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions to produce an atomic bomb.

During Dagan’s tenure, he implemented far-reaching structural changes in the Mossad with the aim of making it a more operations-based organization.

While Dagan headed the Mossad, a number of operations were attributed to the organization, including the assassination of five Iranian nuclear scientists, sabotage of equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the implanting of viruses into the computers that operated the centrifuges to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility in Iran.  Some of these projects — though not the assassinations — were conducted in cooperation with America’s CIA and NSA.

Another important intelligence feat that is attributed to the Mossad under Dagan was a huge amount of information obtained from a laptop computer used by the chairman of Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission. That intelligence was the smoking gun which shaped the decision by then-Prime Minster Ehud Olmert, with the tacit approval of President George W. Bush, to bomb the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007.  Israel has never publicly confirmed destroying that reactor.

Dagan enjoyed the privilege — which was very rare among Mossad chiefs, and other heads of world intelligence agencies — of befriending President Bush, who liked him and his creative mind very much.

Showing the Mossad’s impressive ability to operate in the capital city of the most hostile Arab country, Hezbollah’s military chief — Imad Mugniyeh — was assassinated in Damascus in 2008. Well placed sources described the operation as a joint effort by Mossad agents on the scene, with the CIA playing a role.

Dagan was born in the Soviet Union in 1945 to parents who were Holocaust survivors who moved to Israel after the founding of the Jewish state. He lived in Bat Yam and enlisted into the Paratroopers Brigade, becoming the commander of the Rimon reconnaissance unit which operated in the Gaza Strip during the height of a Palestinian terror wave in the early 1970s. Afterward, he was promoted to fill a number of roles in the IDF command, reaching the rank of Major General.

Among other things, Dagan is considered one of the developers of guerrilla warfare doctrine in the IDF, based on fighting — often ambushing — Palestinian terrorists in Gaza and later in south Lebanon.  These operations cemented his image as a daring combatant who was ready to sanction any means to achieve his aim or target, including the assassination of terrorists.

During his time in the IDF, and especially during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Dagan was considered a confidant of General Ariel Sharon.  After Sharon became prime minister, he appointed Dagan to head the Mossad, despite some discontent expressed among the rank and file of the organization.

Dagan was known to have, at least in his early days, hawkish political views. He even joined the Likud Party.

However, during the course of his work for the Mossad, and after he left the organization, his world view became more moderate.  He urged that a peace agreement be reached with the Palestinians.  He argued with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-defense minster Ehud Barak about various security and diplomatic issues.

While in the Mossad, and even more so afterward, Dagan expressed his opposition to a military strike on Iran.

Dagan  last year addressed a political rally of  opposition parties that called on the public not to vote for Netanyahu.

In January of last year, Dagan expressed his fears about the future of Israel.  “I don’t trust the leadership. I think that the prime minister and [Jewish Home party leader Naftali] Bennett are leading Israel to be a bi-national state, which in my eyes is a disaster and the loss of the Zionist dream.”

Dagan warned that Netanyahu was damaging Israel’s relations with the United States and bringing the ties to the brink of disaster.  That, the ex-Mossad chief insisted, could be extremely costly for Israel.

Living in the shadow of the Holocaust — even showing visitors a photograph of his grandfather being humiliated by German Nazi soldiers — he was a strong advocate that Israel must have a  strong military.  Yet he also insisted that Israel needed to nurture its friendship with the United States and make peace with its Arab neighbors.

“I want to live in a Jewish state. I don’t want to be a slave master and have second class citizens,” Dagan said.

“Unfortunately, between the Jordan River and the sea, there are more than six million Palestinians, some of whom are Israeli citizens, and more than six million Jews.  The policy that we are employing is very problematic on the Palestinian issue.  And on the matter of our behavior toward our greatest ally, the United States. I am very worried,” Dagan added.

“After [the] Yom Kippur [War], I feared for the existence of the state of Israel. If we survived that and managed to make it, I was sure that we could deal with anything. I admit today that I have difficult questions about the directionin which the Israeli leadership is leading us,” the former Mossad chief said.

 

March 17, 2016

Hezbollah Military Chief Could Have Been Assassinated Earlier: Was It Foolish Not to Act?

[This article is based on an article written for The Jerusalem Post by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon and other books about Israeli security and diplomacy.]

In May 2000, the IDF’s Military Intelligence branch (the agency known as Aman) obtained reports and photographs from observation points and aerial patrols proving that senior Hezbollah figures were coming to tour southern Lebanon.  The Lebanese Shi’ite officials would be checking on the IDF’s preparations to withdraw from the security belt which Israel’s army had held since 1982.

Hezbollah believed the IDF would leave that July, and the group hoped to come up with a plan to sabotage the withdrawal and launch an attack on the retreating troops.

“They wanted to turn the withdrawal into an inferno,” says Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilboa, who has written a new book that explores the issue: Dawn. The Real Story of the IDF’s Withdrawal from Lebanon (available soon, only in Hebrew).

“Dawn” was the IDF’s codename for the operation to withdraw from Lebanon.

The full menu of aggression planned by Hezbollah’s commanders included rocket launches, gunfire, setting off roadside bombs and car-bombs, and dispatching suicide bombers.

The IDF began a series of discussions about what could be done to stop senior Hezbollah officials from patrolling in southern Lebanon. On May 21, Military Intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Amos Malka held a meeting that included “Little Mofaz.”  That referred to Shlomo, the brother of then-IDF chief Shaul Mofaz.

Shlomo Mofaz was the head of the terrorism department in Military Intelligence’s research division.

“Mofaz presented information that the most senior officials in Hezbollah are coming to south Lebanon.  It’s a certainty, and we have already made preliminary operational and intelligence preparations among ourselves.  This is a one-time opportunity to assassinate them, or at least, their most senior member.  We’ll present this to the IDF chief,” the book quotes Malka as saying.

“Shlomo,” Gilboa writes, “thought deeply about it and suggested that we transfer the responsibility to decide — from his brother the IDF chief, to the prime minister or defense minister,” who was then Ehud Barak.

The following day, a meeting was to take place to decide whether to take advantage of the opportunity and try to assassinate the senior Hezbollah officials.

What Gilboa does not write in his book and this writer has already published, is that the senior officials in question were “the Fab Five” of Hezbollah’s military wing.

They included the head of the military wing, Imad Mughniyeh, whom Israel, it was claimed, had failed to assassinate on a number of occasions.

Imad Mughniyeh's official Hezbollah portrait

Imad Mughniyeh’s official Hezbollah portrait

Also in the group: his deputies, Talal Hamia and Mustafa Badr a-Din (Mughniyeh’s cousin and brother-in-law), who is the Shi’ite group’s military commander today; and two others, one of whom was a senior officer in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards who was supervising Hezbollah plans against Israel.

At a meeting between Barak and Gadi Eisenkot, the current IDF chief of staff who was then Barak’s military secretary, the following day, “Gadi got into a car with the prime minister and the defense minister and updated him on the planned assassination of senior Hezbollah officials that Malka was suggesting.  Barak listened, and his face lit up when he heard the name of the most senior Hezbollah official [Mughniyeh],” Gilboa writes.

Later, Malka presented the issue of the assassination at a meeting that included Barak and senior IDF officers, including Malka, Shlomo Mofaz, division commander Moshe Kaplinsky and Col. Benny Gantz, who was then the head of the IDF’s liaison unit in Lebanon.

However, it was clear to those present that Barak was distracted. After a few minutes, Barak stopped Malka and declared: “Continue with the intelligence gathering against the object of the assassination.”  His meaning was clear. Barak was not authorizing an assassination.

In Gilboa’s words: “The assassination that the meeting was meant to discuss was thrown in the garbage.”

IDF officers present at the meeting and senior Mossad officials who were aware of the plan, were disappointed since everything was ready.

Had Barak given his approval, the entire leadership of Hezbollah’s military command would have been erased from this Earth.  Hezbollah would have been beaten.

A golden opportunity was wasted, and it would take Israel eight more years and a war (The Second Lebanon War of 2006) until intelligence and operational feasibility would converge again to enable the assassination of Mughniyeh.

According to foreign reports, the assassination of Mughniyeh in February 2008 — in Syria’s capital, Damascus — was mainly a Mossad operation aided by and carried out in coordination with the CIA.

Barak had refused to approve the action in Lebanon because he feared the ramifications it would have on his bigger plan – to fulfill his election promise to bring the IDF back from its 18-year presence in Lebanon.

Initially, Barak had hoped the withdrawal would be carried out through an agreement or understanding between Israel and Syria mediated by U.S. President Bill Clinton.

However, in 2000, after just a few months, he understood that the chances of reaching such an agreement were slim, and Barak ordered IDF Chief of Staff Mofaz to prepare for a withdrawal without agreement.

The timing of the withdrawal was dictated mainly by the rapid collapse of Israel’s mostly Christian allies — the South Lebanon Army (SLA) — to which the IDF turned over control of some of the outposts it evacuated.

When Barak understood that the SLA could not hold the outposts, he gathered IDF commanders on the evening of May 22 – the same day on which he had earlier rejected the assassination operation – and announced that he had ordered Chief of Staff Mofaz and OC Northern Command Gabi Ashkenazi to complete “their preparations to withdraw all IDF forces and prepare them to redeploy starting tonight.”

“Mofaz almost fell off his chair — he was so shocked,” Gilboa writes.

As a strategic decision, the withdrawal could be considered the crowning glory of Barak’s achievements as prime minister and defense minister.  The IDF withdrew without casualties.  But the price of the withdrawal was indeed heavy.

In the security, political and social arenas, history will judge Barak unfavorably.

True, it was impressive that Hezbollah did not succeed in sabotaging the withdrawal. However, the pullout exposed Israel’s betrayal of the 2,500 SLA soldiers who had worked with the Jewish state for years in cooperation and coordination.  All of a sudden, in the dead of night, the SLA men and their famlies found themselves running for their lives to Israel.

In the wake of these events, the unanswered question remains: Did Barak err by not ordering the assassination of Mughniyeh and the other senior Hezbollah officials?  In 2000 it would have changed the reality between Israel and the Shi’ite organization that fought a frightening and bloody war in 2006 and now has armed fighters helping Syria’s regime in that country’s civil war.

March 14, 2016


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