Unprecedented: A Recruiting Video on Mossad’s Website — “Your Imagination is My Reality”

Perhaps inspired by the increasing presence of Israeli spies in popular TV — fictional (and not always attractive) characters on Covert Affairs, Homeland, The Honourable Woman, NCIS and other series — the real-life Mossad is now having its say. On video.

For the first time, the Mossad’s website features a video aimed at making the secret agency’s work look exciting, significant, and satisfying.

It’s in Hebrew, but here are some highlights for the non-Hebrew speaker:

The male and the female (highly likely to be actors, including the smooth and assured voice-overs) are portrayed as family people. That has been a constant theme, when Israeli intelligence operatives and veterans have spoken about their careers — and why they decided to engage in work that they cannot tell anyone about: To strengthen their country and protect their families.

The woman in the video declares: “i learned about myself, things that i didn’t know.” Later, the man says the same things — and he also says: “My friends think I work in marketing.”

Together they say: “I always know there’s someone by my side I can depend on.”

The woman has a provocative line: “Your imagination — is my reality.”

Making the job seem attractive they both say: “I know I’m in the right place.”

And as they head home to their families (including a kid who flies a small drone aircraft?), she has the final word: “This is my mission. And maybe it’s yours.”

September 22, 2014

Mossad’s Longtime Assassinations Chief Has Died: Mike Harari Recently was Talkative

Mike Harari, the longtime head of operations for the Mossad — and founder of the ultra-secretive and effective Kidon unit that specialized in innovative assassinations — has died at age 87 in Israel.

Below please read what we posted about him, this past April 6:

Mike Harari has decided to talk – and the longtime commander of Mossad operations is confirming many of the episodes detailed in our book, Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars.

The long-retired and long-silent head of the operations unit named Caesarea, Harari is now confirming that he led the assassination campaign against Palestinian terrorists – mostly in Europe – after the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

In a TV interview after retiring, he revealed almost nothing, but now...

In a TV interview after retiring, he revealed almost nothing, but now…

It had been believed that Mossad gunmen and bombers killed 5 or 6 Palestinian targets, before a case of mistaken identity – when the wrong man was killed in Norway – ended the string of assassinations in 1973.  A new biography of Harari, published in Hebrew with his full cooperation, says the number was twelve.

Harari is now 87 years old and, to a degree, seems to have decided to set the record straight while he still can do so.

As is stated in our book, Spies Against Armageddon, Caesarea operatives bristle at the notion that the Mossad is considered a kind of Murder: Incorporated. Killing Israel’s enemies is but a small part of what the famed foreign intelligence agency does.

Harari is now revealed to have a Beretta pistol with a silencer framed at home – the very weapon used to kill the first Palestinian target in the post-Munich campaign.

But when he gave the Mossad some valuable advice about ten years ago – stepping out of retirement (as noted when he granted an interview to the newspaper Yediot Ahronot) – did that mission involve assassination?  Yes.  Israel’s spy agency was about to embark on a series of killings of Iranian nuclear scientists, and Mossad veterans with relevant experience were consulted.

Delving farther back into Mossad history, Harari’s new clarifications echo and amplify much of what we describe in Spies Against Armageddon and in our previous books.  He does indeed dismiss as rubbish the portrayal of the post-Olympics killings in Steven Spielberg’s movie, Munich.

Harari also says that the code names publicized by journalists for the series of assassinations – Gideon’s Sword and Wrath of God – are pure inventions. The codes for the individual missions actually were names of Mossad’s female operatives.

As Spies Against Armageddon declares, there was no formal “Committee X” to consider death warrants for terrorists – despite reports by other writers over the years. Rather than a tribunal, there was a list of targets composed by the Caesarea unit – with the help of the military intelligence agency, Aman. Some of them were involved in the planning of the Olympics massacre, and others were just activists in or key helpers of the PLO and its shadowy Black September.

As for the mistake that left the wrong man dead in Lillehammer, Norway – and several Mossad operatives in a Norwegian jail – Harari now offers new details. He says 7 Israelis – a majority of the assassination squad sent to Scandinavia –misidentified the victim. Before the shooting, they declared certainty that the man was Ali Hassan Salameh – a crafty and dangerous Palestinian militant was very close to PLO leader Yasser Arafat.

Other members of the Mossad team, referring to the same photo of Salameh, felt that the man they had located was not the PLO man they were seeking.

Harari’s mistake was going with the majority.

He reveals that he and his boss – then-Mossad chief Zvi Zamir – submitted their resignation, but Prime Minister Golda Meir refused to accept it.

September 22, 2014

A New Mossad Website: “Do the Impossible” — Glitzier Drive to Recruit Spies Worldwide

The Mossad — the foreign intelligence and “special tasks” agency that used to reveal nothing about itself — has launched the most open attempt ever to recruit analysts and spies.

A new graphic says "One doesn't write history, one MAKES history," citing David Ben-Gurion

A new graphic says “One doesn’t write history, one MAKES history,” citing David Ben-Gurion

Take a look at Mossad.gov.il — in the upper right click “EN” to see the site’s pages in English.

In Hebrew there is a surprisingly revelatory list of jobs that the spy agency needs to have filled: including translators, especially to translate from Hebrew to key languages it identifies as English, French, Spanish, and Italian.

Spanish and Italian?  Fertile imaginations will guess that undercover Israelis do a significant amount of work in countries — or with businesses — that use Spanish and Italian.

Part of the new mossad.il.gov

Part of the new mossad.il.gov

As for highly proficient translators to Hebrew — for Israeli consumers of intelligence — the key languages are named as Persian, Russian, and Arabic.

The Mossad website also says the agency is seeking to hire foreign-language instructors to teach adults, especially for these languages: Persian, Arabic, Spanish and “English for business.”

September 21, 2014

After the Scandal Dust Clears, Unit 8200 Will Probably Return to Israel’s Usual Eavesdropping

Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, wrote an analysis of the latest spy scandal in Israel: the protest by reservists in Unit 8200 (specializing in electronic or signals intelligence) who say they can no longer stand eavesdropping on Palestinians — because, they claim, a lot of the information they glean from phone calls and other conversations is unfairly used against innocent Palestinians.

The entire analysis by Melman appears on the website of the weekly newspaper Forward, whicih is published in New York.

Here is an excerpt:

Yossi Melman

Yossi Melman

In their letter, the mutineers stated that they would not carry out their assigned duties because doing so involves, among other things, listening in on the phone calls of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, including many who are uninvolved in violence, to gather information on their health, infidelities, sexual orientations, financial problems, sex habits and other private matters. As the mutineers noted, those nuggets of intelligence are then used to pressure and blackmail the targets, to force them to act as agents and collaborators for the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security service.

The forty-three letter signers also complain that information gleaned from Sigint, or signals intelligence, that they provide sometimes results in the killing of innocent Palestinians during military strikes based on that information.

Their protest shocked Israeli society and generated condemnation from across the Jewish political spectrum, including the mainstream dovish opposition.

“I’m not saying that there are no mistakes. It is certainly possible that there were,” Israeli Labor Party leader Isaac Herzog wrote on his official Facebook page. “But there are ways to complain and to ensure that such claims are examined and discussed.” Herzog is himself a former major in Unit 8200.

But even angrier were thousands of reservists and veterans of the intelligence unit. …

[Yet] despite the current storm, after the dust settles down Unit 8200 will continue with its traditional duties as Israel’s intelligence shield and a hotbed of technology.

[For the full article, CLICK HERE] : Forward.com .

September 17, 2014

Death of an Israeli Spymaster: Former Mossad Director Yitzhak Hofi was 87

A former chief of the Israeli foreign espionage agency, the Mossad, has died.   Yitzhak Hofi, a retired general, was 87 and had varied health problems.

YItzhak Hofi, mossad, spies against armageddon

Yitzhak Hofi, as an officer in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces)

Hofi was head of the Mossad from 1974 to 1982, a period between two major wars: the 1973 Yom Kippur War (which took Israel by surprise, although General Hofi had been one of the few who warned that war could be coming) and the Lebanon war of 1982 (which ensnared the Mossad and all of Israel in a long military occupation and complex secret connections with Arab factions).

As head of the Mossad, he scored several notable achievements.  Obituaries are praising him for his role in rescuing hijacked airline passengers from far-off Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976 — because the daring mission by army commandoes was preceded by Israeli spies surveilling the area and gathering all possible information about the Entebbe airport, the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin and his soldiers, and the German and Palestinian hijackers who held more than a hundred hostages.

In addition (as chronicled in our books, Every Spy a Prince (1990) and Spies Against Armageddon (2014)):

1. As Mossad chief, Hofi led a covert sabotage campaign against the nuclear ambitions of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Israeli operatives killed scientists and damaged equipment that was about to be shipped from Europe to Iraq.

2. Hofi conducted secret peace talks with Egypt, which led to the historic visit to Israel by Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat in 1977 and then an American-mediated peace treaty in 1979.

Official photo of the retired Yitzhak "Haka" Hofi (Mossad chief 1974-1982)

Official photo of the retired Yitzhak “Haka” Hofi (Mossad chief 1974-1982)

3. Hofi arranged a dramatic rescue: the complex airlift of Ethiopian Jews, many of whom struggled to walk long distances to air strips in a neighboring country in complete secrecy. America’s CIA helped at several junctures.

4. Hofi’s Mossad had an important role in continuing a struggle against Palestinian terrorism, although the frustration of the PLO’s Yasser Arafat commanding a large force in neighboring Lebanon was eventually deemed by the Israelis to be intolerant — and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the result.  That involvement, with many tragic mistakes and attempts to manipulate alliances with Lebanese factions, continued for eighteen years until Israeli forces withdrew.

Before he was appointed as Israel’s spymaster, General Hofi earned high praise — as Commander of the Northern Front — for being one of the few Israelis who took seriously the possibility that Syria might invade the Golan Heights (captured by Israel in 1967) and northern Israel. His instincts and observations led him to see that a war in 1973 could be near.

Israel’s Military Intelligence agency (Aman) emphatically rejected the possibility that Egypt or Syria might invade.

September 15, 2014

Unit 8200 Eavesdroppers Don’t Want to Do their Duty? “I Would Court-Martial Them”

Reacting to the protest letter by 43 sergeants and officers in Unit 8200 — the part of Military Intelligence that intercepts telephone conversations and “signals” of all kinds — here is what a former commander of the unit told Yossi Melman:

“If I was still the unit’s commander, I would terminate their [the protesters'] service, court-martialed them, and ask for severe punishment,” Brigadier General Hanan Gefen told Melman [co-author of Spies Against Armageddon].

“They used confidential information [in their protest letter shown to journalists], which they are privy to during their service, to promote their political agenda.”

The IDF Spokesman had this comment — as the official Army response:  “Unit 8200 has been working since its establishment on gathering intelligence that enables the army and the security services to fulfill their missions and helps defend Israel’s citizens on a daily basis.”

September 12, 2014

Rebellion in the Ranks in Israel’s Unit 8200 (Similar to NSA): A Refusal to Furnish Blackmail Material to Security Agencies

Dozens of officers in Unit 8200 — the part of Israel’s Military Intelligence agency (Aman) that specializes in intercepting communications — say they’re refusing to serve, because of how some of the data they obtain is used.

A joint letter from 43 mid-rank officers and sergeants (though including one Major) in the Army reserves states that they will not carry out their assigned duties, because some of the information Unit 8200 harvests — largely by listening in on the phone calls of Palestinians — has to do with their health or their sexual orientation; and those nuggets of intelligence are then handed over to Shin Bet.

Reading between the lines, it seems that Unit 8200 — equivalent to America’s NSA — collects information which enables Shin Bet (domestic security) recruiters to put pressure on individual Palestinians. 

Emblem of Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence)

Emblem of Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence)

Blackmail is commonly one way to “persuade” someone in the enemy camp to become your spy.

The letter was addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence, the Minister of Defense, and even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

Shin Bet (the initials for “The Security Services,” usually known to Israelis by the Hebrew acronym Shabak) is similar to America’s FBI or Britain’s MI5 — a combination of domestic intelligence and law enforcement. Shin Bet has most of the responsibility for monitoring Palestinian radical organizations and activities.

Unit 8200 — formally known to its English-language foreign partners as ISNU (Israeli Sigint National Unit) — is equivalent to America’s NSA (the National Security Agency) and Britain’s GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters).

The 43 protesters — some of whom have shown their letter to Israeli and foreign journalists — also complain that information gleaned from Unit 8200 signals intelligence (sigint) is used to designate targets for attack; and they say some innocent Palestinians have been killed in those strikes.

September 11, 2014

A New Israeli Submarine — Part of Strategic Deterrent and More (Think Nuclear)

[This analysis was written by Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon, for the website of the independent TV news service broadcasting from Israel, i24news.tv.  The original is at:  http://www.i24news.tv/en/opinion/43241-140910-analysis-israel-s-visionary-sub-fleet.]

A few days ago the submarine INS Tanin (Israeli Navy Ship ‘Crocodile’) began its 5,000-mile voyage from Germany’s North Sea port of Kiel, where it was built, to its future home in Israel’s Mediterranean harbor Haifa.

Tanin is the Israeli Navy’s fourth submarine, joining three previous models of the Dolphin class vessels. Two additional submarines will enter into service within four years, making the Israeli submarine fleet one of the biggest and most powerful in a region from the Indian Ocean, via the Persian (Arab) Gulf, to Europe.

An Israeli Dolphin-class Submarine (photo courtesy shlomiliss)

An Israeli Dolphin-class Submarine (photo courtesy shlomiliss)

Israel began expanding its aging, outdated submarine fleet in the early 1990s, when it only had two British-made vessels. It was partly a strategic decision and partly exploitation of circumstances.

In 1991, during the first Gulf war and Iraq’s Scud missile attacks on Israel, then-German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visited Israel in a gesture of solidarity. He was confronted with revelations that German companies had sold equipment, materials and technology to Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons program. Apparently feeling guilt at the German firms’ involvement in a program that could have threatened to gas the Jewish state, Genscher agreed to Israel’s request to finance its navy’s first two modern-day submarines. The total cost of the six subs is estimated at 2.5 billion euro.

Strategically, this was a visionary approach. Realizing that Iraq already had nuclear aspirations, and anticipating that other nations such as Iran would follow suit, Israeli leaders concluded that their country – which had always tried to maintain a strategic edge over its enemies – needed to have second-strike nuclear capability, according to foreign media reports.

Though Israel’s nuclear policy is defined as ambiguous – neither denying nor confirming reports that it possesses such weapons – it is widely assumed to have a nuclear arsenal.

Such a powerful fleet of submarines will upgrade Israeli military capabilities in two areas.

Firstly, improving its intelligence gathering efforts: a submarine is a launching pad that sails undetected near enemy coasts, listening to communications or landing naval commandos.

Even more importantly, however, as stealth vehicles the submarines can store and fire missiles, either conventional or nuclear, even if the country’s alleged land-based nuclear arsenal is destroyed by an enemy’s first strike.

The arrival of the fourth Tanin submarine has brought back into the public discourse an old reality. Despite the recent Gaza war — and the current panic over the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as an additional terror threat to Israel, its pro-Western neighbors, Europe and America — the Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still mainly concerned that Iran will eventually have nuclear weapons.

This possibility is even more acute because of IS advances in Iraq and Syria. IS military successes would serve Shi’ite Iran as further justification that Iran actually requires a strategic and deterring weapon against its enemies – not necessarily Israel, but the Sunni Islamist barbarians.

In the last decade, when it became evident that Iran was rushing toward a nuclear threshold, there were voices both in Israel and outside advocating for an Israeli rethinking of its own nuclear possibilities. Scholars – but also some within the defense establishment – wondered about the causality of events, suggesting that Iran’s nuclear ambitions were a reaction to Israel’s alleged nuclear monopoly. Some even suggested that Israel promote a Middle East nuclear-free zone, and thus eventually agree to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

Fortunately, this advice was rejected by Israeli decision-makers. With the changes and uncertainties in the Middle East, a region which today seems to be in the process of redefining its boundaries and national entities, it is clear once again the extent to which Israel’s founding fathers displayed vision when they decided that the only way to survive in this rough and hostile neighborhood was to have strategic state-of-the-art tools.

The ambiguous nuclear policy must remain in place. It will provide Israel not only with the ultimate insurance policy for its existence and also will give the leadership – though probably not the current government – the self-confidence necessary to take risks in peace negotiations, regional security arrangements and territorial concessions.

September 10, 2014

Middle East Surprise: Israel and Iran Share Interests — De Facto Allies in Pushing Back ISIS

If — as an old saying goes — politics makes strange bedfellows, then in Middle East politics we surely find the strangest.

Flag of Israel CIAThe latest undeclared and unintentional alliance is that of Israel and Iran. Both are strongly opposed to ISIS, and both are active supporters of the Kurds. The support is focused, in recent years, in the Kurdish autonomous region that is part of Iraq.

Yossi Melman, co-author of books including Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, wrote the following article for The Jerusalem Report, which is published in English in Israel.Flag of Iran

- o – o – o -

On August 26, twelve hours before a ceasefire ended the 51-day Israel-Gaza war, a no less significant event took place a thousand kilometers away from Tel Aviv. This event, like the Gaza war, signifies the rapidly changing new reality in the Middle East – a reality that is replete with severe dangers for Israel but also opens windows of opportunity for a radically different regional lineup.

In Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with the Kurdish President Masoud Barzani. In a joint press conference, the two revealed that Iran had agreed to supply weapons and ammunition to the Kurdish army, which is battling the extremist Islamic State (IS or ISIS).

The Kurds are fighting alongside the Iraqi army with the backing of the U.S. Air Force.

According to foreign reports, Israel in the past has supplied weapons and military advice and know-how to the Kurds. During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran (then a monarchy under the Shah) and Israel were strategic allies working together to assist the Kurds led by Mustafa Barzani (father of Masoud) in their battle for self-rule against Saddam Hussein’s government in Baghdad.

Thirty-five years after the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has demonized Israel as the “small Satan,” the two sworn enemies find themselves on the same side of a Middle Eastern front and sharing at least one national interest – to stop the advance of the bloodthirsty ISIS forces.

Even in Syria, where a civil war has raged since early 2011 (with the United Nations now estimated almost 200,000 deaths), Israel and Iran share a surprising set of interests.

They both want to stop the growing influence, beheadings, mass shootings, military victories, and territorial advances of ISIS.

Iran and its Lebanese Shiite proxy, Hezbollah, are deeply involved in the battle to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. That has involved battling ISIS.

Israel is hoping — and preparing, if necessary, to take action — to prevent ISIS from taking control of the Syrian side of the 100-kilometer long stretch of border on the Golan Heights. The area had been mostly quiet for 40 years.

However, quiet on the Golan seems to be becoming more elusive by the day. Two days after the fighting in Gaza came to an end, several incidents took place near the Israeli border that bode ill for Israel.

It began with extremist rebel forces, not including ISIS, fighting the Damascus regime and its Hezbollah and Iranian allies, taking over the Syrian side of the Quneitra border crossing with Israel. Three-hundred rebels stormed the compound, and the small Syrian army force on site fled.

On August 28, rebels from Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front) took captive dozens of UN peacekeepers from Fiji stationed in the demilitarized zone near the border. The captured Fijians are part of UNDOF – the UN Disengagement Observer Force – a mechanism that was put in place at the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The UNDOF mandate, renewed every few years, was to ensure that Israel and Syria maintain the cease-fire and separation of forces. A demilitarized (buffer) zone was established on both sides of the border – banning the entrance of armor and overflights.

Jabhat al-Nusra is considered to be a branch of al-Qaeda operating in Syria and Lebanon. Nusra, numbering some 7,000 mostly Syrian fighters spread out across the country, reached the Golan about two years ago. The numbers in that area have grown over the last few months as ISIS forces took control of northeast Syria – of late overtaking the Syrian air base at Tabqa and declaring the city of Raqqa as their capital of a self-declared caliphate – thus pushing the Nusra fighters southward.

With the exception of a few isolated positions, the entire 100-kilometer border strip is controlled by rebel forces, much of it by Nusra units. Their hatred for Israel is strong. Like ISIS, they wave a black flag, aim to carve out a caliphate, and they also abduct foreigners.

Despite all of this, Israel has managed over the past year to develop reasonably neighborly ties with the various factions, including Nusra.

One factor that has helped to advance this relationship: more than 1,000 casualties from the civil war who have been brought into Israel for treatment at the Sieff Hospital in Safed, the Rambam Hospital in Haifa, and an IDF field hospital set up near the border.

The situation is reminiscent (if on a small-scale) of the “good fence” policy Israel had on the Lebanese border in the 1970s. The establishment of a hospital and transfer of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees in camps in Jordan and Turkey — done by Israeli private donors and non-governmental organizations on the coattails of the government and the IDF — are part of a very clear approach to make every effort to preserve quiet along the border.

On the other hand, armed conflict and chaotic conditions have always presented opportunities for the other side to glean intelligence. Amid the uncertainties, where it is difficult to distinguish between friend and foe, it is easier to recruit agents from among a confused and desperate population, or to send in reconnaissance missions.

ISIS has no hold on the Golan Heights, but it does have a small force of fighters in a few of the villages near the border. This presence is not a strong source of concern for Israel, but the defense establishment is keeping a very close watch on developments.

The volatile situation in Syria in general and in the battles on the border in particular can change at any moment. The danger that the continued advance of ISIS in Syria will whet its appetite and lead them toward the Israeli border cannot be ignored.

To add to the chaos, while the UN hostage crisis remained unresolved, an Israeli anti-aircraft battery firing a Patriot missile shot down a hostile drone violating its air space near Quneitra.

Israeli sources could not determine whether the unmanned aerial vehicle belonged to Syria, Hezbollah, or Iran, but its purpose was the same. It was on a reconnaissance mission – not necessarily against Israel, but probably to assess and photograph the rebel positions on the Syrian side of the Golan.

This illustrates the irony surrounding the Syrian-Israeli border crisis: Israel doesn’t want the Islamists to control the border area, and Israel prefers Assad’s army as the devil it already knows. However, holding the regime officially responsible for violations of the disengagement agreement, the IDF shoots back at the Syrian army — regardless of who truly fired into Israel.

Israel’s policy of non-intervention in Syria’s civil war has not changed. Yet Israel has taken action more than half-a-dozen times: with air force attacks on convoys or weapons depots of the Syrian army to stop the transport of advanced missiles  and radar to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Israel never claimed responsibility for these attacks, which has allowed both sides to preserve deniability and keep Assad’s regime from feeling humiliated and forced into attacking in response.

Despite Israel’s non-intervention policies, there are voices within the defense establishment and intelligence communities who have second thoughts about whether it is better for Israel that Assad stays in power.

At the outset of the Syrian war, the prevailing idea in the Israeli decision-making echelon was that it was in the national interest to see Assad go. It was then-defense minister Ehud Barak who declared that Assad’s days were numbered, giving him three weeks before being toppled. This attitude was based on the fact that Hezbollah and Iran – Israel’s most hated rivals – were on Assad’s side.

So the old dictum of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” prevailed.

Now, however, the same concept is pushing Israeli leaders to realize that Assad, Iran and Hezbollah – having such a dangerous enemy as ISIS – could, at least on one front, find themselves with an alliance of interests with Israel.

As such, in Syria – like in Iraq, with the Kurds – Israel might find itself on the same side as Iran.

The events in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the phenomenal changes the Middle East has undergone in recent years. Old alliances are disintegrating. Old interests are becoming unimportant. The ties between the various forces are changing, and new players are emerging onto the scene.

[The original article: http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/A-web-of-alliances-374231]

September 3, 2014

Who’s on the Syrian Side Near Israel? Nusra, FSA, and Brotherhood — Not ISIS, Not for Now

Here’s the latest from a senior Israeli military source who’s very well informed about the situation along the Syrian border — or, as some would put it, along the October 1973 armistice line on the Golan Heights.

The main headline is that Syria’s government does not control its side of the line. After more than 3 and a half years of civil war in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad’s army has been driven away from the frontier with Israel.

Anti-Assad rebels are now massed along the fences meant to separate Syria from Israeli forces, settlements, and vineyards.


Considering the terror spread worldwide by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL), here’s some good news for Israel:ISIS doesn’t seem to be up close at the Golan Heights fence. The Islamic State is instead near the Iraqi border — and has poured a large number of fighting men into Iraq. (It should be noted that ISIS propaganda does promise that the eventual “caliphate” the group hopes to establish would include replacing the Jewish state of Israel with an Arab Muslim state of Palestine.)

So who are the rebels at the fence?

The Israeli military source made it clear Israel is closely watching what he refers to as “a 100-kilometer border strip.” Aman — the military intelligence agency — counts between 1,000 and 1,500 anti-Assad fighters on the Syrian side.

Roughly one-third are part of An-Nusra Front (which seems to identify strongly with the late Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda). One-third are labeled as Muslim Brotherhood — the organization smashed by Assad’s father, the late dictator Hafez al-Assad, when his army carried out the huge massacre in Hama in 1982.

The remaining one-third — as many as 500 fighters — along the frontier are part of the Free Syrian Army. Commanders of the FSA include many who have met with American and other Western envoys — and even with Senator John McCain last year, on both sides of Turkey’s border with Syria.

As the FSA continues to maneuver, cajole, and pray for arms and training from the U.S., that group is not believed to be strongly hostile to Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood fighters are considered to be entirely busy with their own Syrian concerns, and cynically could be said to be “happy they’re alive.” Attacking or pestering Israel is unlikely to be high on their agenda.

The Nusra Front, however, could be a different story. Its fighters kidnapped several dozen United Nations peacekeepers from Fiji — and then fought a gunbattle with UNDOF troops from the Philippines who refused to be taken prisoner. (UNDOF is the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force which has patrolled the Golan Heights since late 1973.)

To try to prove themselves to be pan-national Islamic heroes, the Nusra Front fighters could conceivably lob some shells at Israel — or even try to infiltrate the Israeli side to stage a headline-grabbing attack. But that is not considered likely.

public CIA map of Syria

public CIA map of Syria

The Israeli source notes that Syria’s air force has bombed the rebel positions. Also, because both the rebels and Syria’s army have used tanks in the area, the Syrians are violating the disengagement accords (which UNDOF is meant to police).

Israel does not, however, feel itself to be in danger from that front — so it does nothing except file occasional complaints with the U.N.   Israel’s military is, however, preparing for the possibility of armed conflict on the Golan in the future.

Israel formally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, eight years after capturing the territory from Syria. Occasional negotiations that might have returned most of the land to Syria, in exchange for a reliable peace treaty, led to nought. For the foreseeable future, Israel would prefer that UNDOF remain to help keep matters calm.

Israeli intelligence, meantime, is monitoring all the factions in Syria. Anyone who is familiar with intelligence techniques can see that even an admirable humanitarian gesture — such as providing hospital treatment in northern Israel to selected Syrians who are wounded in the civil war — affords Israeli intelligence many opportunities to become intimately acquainted with what is occurring inside Syria.

September 3, 2014

“Not an Episode of ‘Homeland’” – Will Take Patience & Imaginative Espionage to Penetrate and Counter ISIS: Raviv to Potomac Institute

Dan on CBS This Morning closeup 071212Dan Raviv, CBS News correspondent (in Washington) and co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars and other books, spoke for 15 minutes about the radical group The Islamic State (ISIS) and how Western nations can develop innovative ways to confront and weaken ISIS.

Don’t expect Israel to have a major role in this, Raviv said, but larger countries can adapt — and enlarge — what Israel has done to penetrate and manipulate terrorist organizations. He pointed out that the hospital in northern Israel where selected Syrian casualties of the civil war are treated “is an intelligence bonanza opportunity.”

He told the audience of mostly diplomats and retired government officials at The Potomac Institute: “Use your imagination,” because excellent intelligence agencies do.
The 15-minute video, thanks to C-Span television, is below. Simply click to watch it.

August 30, 2014

What’s in the New ‘Spies Against Armageddon’? Mossad Options Limited in Iran, Palestinian Peace Hopes Stymied, Pressure from America, Upheavals in Syria and Egypt — and a Traitor

The authors of a best-selling history of Israel’s intelligence community – who revealed in 2012 that the Mossad had Israeli assassins operating inside Iran – now report that the assassination campaign has stopped.

Mossad chiefs decided that it became too dangerous, as Iran’s counter-intelligence units conducted an intensive manhunt. The Mossad could risk seeing its best combatants – Israel’s term for its most talented and experienced spies – arrested and hanged. Another factor: strong signals to Israel by the Obama Administration that it did not want acts of violence to continue inside Iran when negotiations were starting.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ordered the Mossad instead to focus – inside Iran – on hunting for evidence that the Iranians are cheating on their nuclear commitments to the West.

A new edition of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars reveals that the Mossad – the lethal, feared and respected intelligence agency of Israel – is going through tough times, even as the Middle East is in turmoil: posing an unprecedented set of challenges to Israel and the United States.  (The new edition was published in the Spring of 2014.)

In their updated book the authors – Dan Raviv of CBS News and Israeli journalist Yossi Melman (whose jointly written Every Spy a Prince was a national best seller in 1990) – report that a four-year campaign of assassinations ended after the killings of 5 nuclear scientists in Iran. The Associated Press and The New York Times (July 12, 2012) reported on Raviv and Melman’s original Spies Against Armageddon.

"Updated - New Revelations"

“Updated – New Revelations”

Also related to Iran, according to the updated book, the Mossad suffered unprecedented blows in 2013 when it was revealed that two of its operatives betrayed the organization and caused severe damage to its operations, morale, and omnipotent image. In prison they were known only as X and X2 – their identities kept secret by Israeli censorship and judicial gag orders. X turned out to be an Australian-born Mossad man whose story was unveiled after he hanged himself in his cell.

Authorities continue to block release of any details of X2’s action, except to hint that he gravely endangered former teammates.

The new Spies Against Armageddon has fresh information and perspective on huge events that have occurred since the original book came out in 2012:

–The civil war in Syria has become more vicious and complex, with the death toll rising to 130,000 and the list of lethal participants broadening to include al-Qaeda groups and intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other foreigners. Israeli spies were sent into action (crossing borders), and the air force has bombed Syrian targets – without any public confirmation.

–Egypt has had two changes of leadership: first, the election of a Muslim Brotherhood president, and then the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian military. Israeli intelligence now secretly cooperates with Egypt against radicals in the Sinai – and potentially against Hamas in Gaza.

–Iran reached an interim agreement with the West, agreeing to scale back nuclear activities for at least six months; and Israeli leaders are frankly alarmed by signs of a rapprochement between Iran and America. The Mossad is scouring for evidence of cheating by Iran.

–The Israelis and Palestinians tried negotiating for a possible end to their historic conflict, and the intelligence community prepared for a possible outbreak of violence as Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts collapsed. A 51-day war between Israel and Gaza ensued within months.

–All the significant players in the Middle East seem to agree that leadership by the United States has been lacking, with Egyptians, Syrians, Iranians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and others – including America’s allies in Israel – wondering what President Barack Obama really wants.

The newly updated Spies Against Armageddon reveals that Israel has had to adjust rapidly its response to the tragic civil war that continues in neighboring Syria. Even as Israeli doctors treat wounded civilians, the Mossad takes the opportunity to glean intelligence – and, based on well established patterns, spies take advantage of chaos by crossing in and out of Syria.

Iran has been the Mossad’s top focus since 2002, but the mission has changed. As noted above, the assassination campaign has ended, due to increased dangers and opposition by the United States. Also narrowing Israel’s options: the Obama Administration’s determination to “give the talks a chance.” It’s clear now that Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would not dare to bomb Iran. Netanyahu might saber-rattle, but there is no likely military option now

The Iranians, meantime, learned how to defend their nuclear computers and thus minimized damage from cyber-attacks – such as the Stuxnet virus, a joint U.S.-Israel creation.

Spies Against Armageddon is published in paperback and all e-book formats by Levant Books. Over 20,000 copies of Spies Against Armageddon have sold so far in Barnes & Noble outlets, independent bookstores, and on line. In addition to the national best seller Every Spy a Prince, other books co-authored by Raviv and Melman include Friends In Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance and Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians.

Their blog is IsraelSpy.com .

August 29, 2014

Gaza War Just ‘Finished’, Israel Has a New Crisis Spilling Over from Syria: It’s Not ISIS — Not Yet

[Yossi Melman, co-author of the updated history of Israeli intelligence and security agencies -- Spies Against Armageddon -- wrote this article for the website of the non-stop TV news service based in Israel, i24news.tv.]

Even as Israelis took a deep breath of relief as the cease-fire in the Gaza war continued to hold, they awoke Wednesday morning to realize that a new source of concern had opened on the northern border.

Syrian opposition forces, after fierce battles with the Syrian army, took over the Quneitra border crossing in the Golan Heights.

The border crossing is the only official gate between Syria and Israel, manned by the United Nations Disengagement Observatory Force (UNDOF), in place since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

For a few hours, the news from the northern border increased Israeli concern, due to reports that the Nusra Front – Islamists identified with Al-Qaeda and supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar – had seized controlled of the area. Hours later, different reports suggested that a secular unit of the Free Syrian Army was in control of the crossing.

Nevertheless, the incidents in Quneitra were a wake-up call for Israel, demonstrating how the changing events in the Middle East — from the advances of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria to turmoil in Libya and the Gaza war — are affecting old Israeli security doctrines and stability.

i24 black logoFor three and a half years, Israel has tried to stay away from the Syrian civil war, having one ultimate interest in mind: maintaining security and stability at the border and preserving the routine tranquility of Israel’s rural communities in the Golan Heights (the land captured from Syria in the Six-Day War of 1967 and then formally annexed by Israel).

On occasion, Israel interfered in the war when its intelligence uncovered attempts by President Bashar Assad’s regime to supply weapons – mainly long-range Iranian or Syrian-made missiles – to Hezbollah as a payment for the Shiite Lebanese movement’s support for the Syrian government in the war.

The Israeli Air Force attacked supply convoys six times, but never claimed responsibility for those airstrikes — thus leaving a space of deniability and providing the Syrian government a face-saver to turn a blind eye to the blatant Israeli violations of Syria’s sovereignty.

In other instances, Israel responded with mild artillery shells whenever errant fire or mortars landed on the Israeli side of the border. These were seen as unintentional results of clashes between the opposition forces and the Syrian army.

In this way, Israel believed it was preserving its deterrence vis-à-vis the Syrian government, without humiliating the Assad regime.

But in the last year, the opposition forces – Islamists of the Nusra Front and the Free Syrian Army – took over most of the Syrian army positions close to Israel. Following Wednesday’s events, they now almost entirely control a 100-kilometer strip on the UNDOF-patrolled frontier.


Realizing the changes along its border, Israel secretly began to reach out to the Syrian opposition forces in order to ensure that they would not turn hostile. Israel opened a field hospital on the border and has in the last year treated more than 1,000 wounded combatants and civilians. On the face of it, this is a humanitarian gesture, but it also helps Israel maintain good neighborly relations with the opposition forces in Syria, hoping to ensure that the border will stay relatively calm.

Nevertheless, there are hostile elements such as the Islamic State in the vicinity. The ISIS forces are small and insignificant in this area, but they are a potential threat to the stability of what used to be Israel’s quiet border for many years.

At the same time, these and other regional events in Iraq and Kurdistan also provide an opportunity for new alliances in the region. It was revealed this week that Iran is supplying the Iraqi Kurdish authorities with ammunition and weapons to repel ISIS (also known as IS, and the Obama Administration calls it ISIL).

Israel, a traditional covert ally of the Kurds, is also still assisting them in the security and military field. For the first time since 1979 when Iran overthrew the Shah and became an Islamic Republic, Iran and Israel have found themselves supporting the same side on of the Middle East’s major fronts.

It should also not be ruled out that Israel may now have second thoughts about the events in Syria and would prefer – maybe even passively support — the Assad regime staying in power, despite the fact that Israel’s long-sworn enemies Iran and Hezbollah are on Assad’s side.

August 28, 2014

Israel Won the Gaza War: Hamas Practically Crawled to the Ceasefire Deal

[Yossi Melman, co-author of Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, wrote this analysis for Wednesday's Jerusalem Post newspaper.]

If the cease-fire holds, and that is a big if, the results of the 50-day war in Gaza will mark an important and impressive achievement for Israel. 

Hamas was forced to accept Egyptian and Israeli dictates. Hamas crawled to the cease-fire. One should not be impressed by the well-organized victory festivities in Gaza.

Most of Hamas’s demands and preconditions were rejected from the outset. The cease-fire is unlimited in time and Hamas was not promised anything except that which had been offered at the start of the military campaign. 

Full of itself and arrogant, it miscalculated. If Hamas had not rejected the offers, Israel would not have launched a ground incursion. Hamas’s 32 attacking tunnels would not have been destroyed. Its rockets and mortar shells wouldn’t be reduced to a residual arsenal of one-third – from 10,000 to approximately 2,000. And most importantly, parts of Gaza wouldn’t have been destroyed.

{See all our Middle East coverage, focused on Israeli espionage and security but a lot more, by going to IsraelSpy.com and scrolling down for our posts since 2012.  Or, just tap the HOME tab in the upper right of this page. Also, for the latest, follow us on Twitter @SpiesArmageddon.}

Unfortunately, Gaza has been set back decades. More than 5,000 houses were destroyed. Another 1,000 were damaged and on the verge of collapse. Gaza has been suffering water and electricity shortages. 

Three-hundred thousand residents – 15 percent of its population – turned into homeless refugees within the boundaries of the small enclave, which was already mostly one big refugee camp. 

Anger, despair and frustration are ruling the day in Gaza. Surely people will not go to protest in the streets. Hamas has established a reign of fear and terror.

Hamas’s highly publicized executions during the war, and in particular last week, of alleged traitors were not aimed at unveiling and disrupting Israeli intelligence operations. They were aimed at sending a clear message to the Gazans: We are Hamas and we are here to stay. Don’t dare revolt against us. 

But the locals have a long memory. They will remember who brought them the calamity.

In a sense, the Gaza war is reminiscent of what happened during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Hezbollah was defeated. Its secretary-general admitted it in public. But then he heard Israeli defense commentators who criticized the war’s conduct by then-prime minister Ehud Olmert’s government. That made the Hezbollah leader regain his self-confidence.

Hassan Nasrallah told himself that if stupid Israel thought that it was defeated, so let it be – and he declared his false victory.

Eight years later, it is quite clear that “the Second Lebanon War” brought Israel significant gains at the strategic level. Northern Israel has enjoyed peace and tranquility. Hezbollah is deterred and doesn’t dare to initiate violent and aggressive actions against the Jewish state. Nasrallah himself is in hiding, fearing for his life.

As then, some of the veteran commentators in the 2006 war coverage now express the same criticism with the same weeping voices, claiming that Hamas defeated Israel.

Sooner or later it will emerge that as against Hezbollah, Israel will deter Hamas too.

As in the Second Lebanon War, the military campaign in Gaza unmasked some IDF tactical failures and gains for Hamas. The Islamist movement showed determination, and its combatants proved to be capable guerrilla fighters with some daring and innovative operations. Jerusalem Post logo ad

Hamas fighters stood up for 50 days against the mighty Israeli war machine. They paralyzed Israel’s international airport for two days. Israel’s economy took a relative hit. They tried to infiltrate in commando operations from the sea and the tunnels. But in most cases they failed and achieved nothing significant.

The bottom line is that Hamas failed to reach its strategic goals. Israel showed determination and except for some anti-war demonstrations, the Israeli home front was stubborn and did not break down.

Did Netanyahu Achieve His Gaza War Goals?

Did Netanyahu Achieve His Gaza War Goals?

The real index with which to check Israel’s gains is against the war’s declared aims. The leading trio – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz – who have shown reason and self-restraint in order to avoid more casualties, were determined not to surrender to populist voices, including from their cabinet colleagues who pulled out long knives to stab them in the back and demanded to “smash Hamas.” Netanyahu, Ya’alon and Gantz decided neither to occupy Gaza nor to topple the Hamas regime.

Having said all that, much depends on the cease-fire being honored.

Even if it is respected, there is a need to leverage the blows inflicted on Hamas into a brave and breakthrough move to increase the chances of a serious and genuine negotiation with the Palestinian Authority. The aim should be a deal over the West Bank.

Only then will it be possible to talk about the strategic victory of Israel and Zionist history. But such a step is under a heavy cloud of doubt. Can Netanyahu show the same willpower and determination he manifested in war to make peace?

August 27, 2014

‘Newsweek’ Magazine Cites Yossi Melman on Assassinations: Part of Israeli War Strategy?

In its latest issue, Newsweek magazine has an article by New York-based Benny Avni that explores whether targeted assassinations are a part of Israeli war strategy.

An airstrike : IDF photo

An airstrike : IDF photo

It certainly can be argued that in the flurry of events that led to a ceasefire — which seems to represent the end of the Gaza war after more than 7 weeks of bloodshed — highly targeted Israeli airstrikes made the big difference.

Based on precise intelligence, Israel managed to kill at least three — and probably more — senior Hamas military commanders in Gaza. Then, as seen on TV worldwide, Israel’s air force flattened three tall buildings in the heart of Gaza city.

Israel’s intelligence agencies and military (the IDF) seemed to be showing off their capabilities for precision — coupled with more effective early warning that prompted nearly all the residents of the doomed tower blocks to leave before the edifices were destroyed.

In Newsweek, Benny Avni wrote about why Israel decided to take the shots — and kill the Hamas commanders:

“This is not about revenge,” says Yossi Melman, a leading Israeli expert on counterterrorism and espionage. “Yes, revenge may play a role, but the main goal is to disrupt future attacks.

…But does it work? “Assassinations are pyrotechnics,” says Melman, co-author of the book Spies Against Armageddon. “There are no illusions on the Israeli side that it’s a cure-all. At best, it disrupts the enemy temporarily. But that’s the nature of the war on terror: Every victory is temporary.”


August 27, 2014

Iran ‘Shot Down an Israeli Spy Drone’? Probably Just Propaganda and Doesn’t Add Up: Analysis

Israelis who work on their country’s unmanned aircraft programs are shaking their heads at the official Iranian video of a smashed aircraft — said by Iran to be “an Israeli drone, a Hermes model, shot by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”

The Israelis say: “It doesn’t look like one of ours.”

First, there’s the matter of the maximum flying range for an Israeli-made drone.  Natanz — the nuclear enrichment center south of Tehran — is too far away for a drone operating from Israel, if one adds up the flying distance and the reconnaissance time that would be needed over the target.

It is true, as an official Iranian report on that country’s Press TV is suggesting, that Israel could fly recon missions out of a country much closer to Iran. Israel is reliably reported to have a close intelligence relationship with Azerbaijan.

Official Iranian Photo

Official Iranian Photo

However, David Harari feels that this story doesn’t add up. He is a former head of the drone division at IAI — Israel Aerospace Industries (the former Israel Aircraft Industries, which makes airplanes and more for both civilian and military uses).

Harari headed the drone division from 1977 to 1993 and keeps up with developments.

He says the smashed device seen in the official Iranian video looks like a drone, but a very small one — a “mini drone.” That makes it very unlikely that it’s an Israeli device, he says.

Harari adds that it surely doesn’t look like a Hermes — the model specifically named by the Iranians.

“It’s strange,” he adds, “very strange.”

There are other nations, of course — not only Israel — that would keep an eye on Iran’s nuclear facilities and might want to test the air defenses around them.

August 25, 2014

Israel Hasn’t Won or Lost the Gaza War — But Now Hopes to Kill Top Hamas Leaders: Victory?

After the latest ceasefire broke down — with Hamas and Israel both finding it pointless to keep negotiating in Cairo — Israel is attempting “shock and awe” tactics: first, with an airstrike that flattened an apartment building and aimed to kill Hamas’s military chief. Then came another airstrike, with impressive precision, destroying a house in which three senior military men of Hamas were meeting — and all three were killed.

On Sunday (24 August) word came that an Israeli missile destroyed a car driven by Hamas’s top finance official. But do targeted assassinations help, in the long run?

[Yossi Melman, co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince and the new, updated history of Israel's intelligence agencies Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, wrote this article for Friday's Jerusalem Post newspaper.]

Dead or alive? Was Muhammad Deif, legendary chief of the Izzedin Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, eliminated in a targeted killing by Israel – or did he survive the attack?

Israelis and Palestinians have been asking that question since the early hours of Wednesday morning, when reports of an attempted assassination first surfaced. The assumption is that he was killed or gravely wounded, but more than 48 hours later, we remain in the dark.

Hamas’s websites and spokesmen declared Deif alive and kicking. Some of them even made a mockery of what they described as yet another Israeli failure to assassinate him.

Israel's air force: assassination weapons

Israel’s air force: assassination weapons

Indeed, like a cat with nine lives, Deif has survived at least four attempts by Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the military to kill him.

Israeli officials added to the aura of mystery by remaining ambiguous. They hinted he was most probably killed but weren’t sure, and they did not wish to commit themselves to a statement they would regret.

Let’s assume for a moment that Deif was killed in the attack: What would the implications and ramifications of such a hit be?

Already severely disabled due to earlier attacks, Deif had become in recent years more of an “honorary” commander of the military wing . Nevertheless, he was involved in the major strategic military decisions taken by the movement – including transforming Hamas into a semi-military organization with battalions and brigades (with two of its six brigade commanders killed in a joint Shin Bet-Israel Air Force operation this week after Deif was hit). Deif was also involved in the tunnel and rocket programs.

Thus, killing him could be a tactical gain for Israel, a boost to Israel’s morale during the frustrating Gaza war, and a psychological blow for Hamas.

The Gaza war has become more about public relations, images, and spin than about success in the battlefield. Every side aspires for an Iwo Jima-style “victory photo” – and killing Deif could provide that image for Israel.

There is a downside, however: If Deif managed to survive a fifth Israeli attempt on his life, it will elevate his godlike status not just within Hamas, but among the Palestinian constituency everywhere.

The larger question here is whether Israel’s assassination policy is paying off.

For decades, Israeli intelligence chiefs have debated the wisdom and effectiveness of the policy – a debate that is less of a moral or ethical deliberation, but a more practical one.

David Kimche (1928-2010), photo by WorldJewishCongress.org

David Kimche (1928-2010), photo by WorldJewishCongress.org

The late David Kimche, a senior Mossad operative, told me more than a decade ago that he and his colleagues had discussed many times whether the organization should be involved in assassinations and targeted killings. Some argue against it, claiming that the Mossad is not a Murder, Inc., and killing terrorist leaders is counterproductive.

A quick reminder: Less than two years ago, Israel’s previous campaign in Gaza opened with the killing of Ahmed Jabari, then the operations chief of Hamas’s military wing, as Deif was still recuperating from his Israeli-inflicted wounds. Quickly enough, Hamas recovered from the loss of Jabari and replaced him with a new commander, Marwan Issa, who today is still the military wing’s acting chief.

There are many other examples, the most blatant being the 1992 assassination of Hezbollah secretary-general Abbas Moussawi; he was replaced by a more skillful leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

The long history of Israel’s war against terrorist leaders and military operatives reads like the final chapter of the Passover Seder: one killing leads to a new leader, who is then killed, followed by a new leader, and so forth.

But on the other hand, does a country fighting terrorism have a choice? The nature of asymmetrical struggle between a state and a terror group is that it is an ongoing battle – a kind of war of attrition with no knockout blow possible.

Israel – and for that matter, any other nation in a similar situation – doesn’t have the luxury of projecting an image of weakness and thus has to hit, retaliate, and assassinate the enemy’s operatives.

This is not in order to take revenge, but as a step to disrupt future plots and eliminate the other side’s most capable leaders and commanders.

Israel’s intelligence and security apparatus has for years tried to devise a doctrine detailing when and whom to target, based on how useful the termination would be. There are no textbook answers, only general observations.

Killing a leader of a small group – a nearly one-man show – can paralyze that organization. But when it comes to larger terrorist groups well-rooted in the community, sooner or later a new – sometimes even more talented and daring – chief will turn up.

Regardless of whether Deif is dead or alive, it will not change the reality of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

Both sides need an exit strategy, a long-term agreement to end the violence. For that to happen, they must swallow their pride and agree to a compromise.

August 24, 2014

Gaza Talks in Cairo May Resume Sometime, but Israeli Leaders Assume Hamas Will Take Over the West Bank: Crises are Certain, Peace is Not

by YOSSI MELMAN in Tel Aviv

[Yossi Melman is co-author of the best seller Every Spy a Prince and the new, updated history of Israeli intelligence and security, Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars. This is adapted from his article in Tuesday's Jerusalem Post newspaper.]

There were five possible outcomes to the Gaza ceasefire talks in Cairo — which abruptly ended, when the violence resumed on Tuesday night (19 August): a long-term agreement, which is not very likely at this point; an Egyptian announcement that the sides had agreed to extend the truce; simultaneous announcements by Israel and Hamas that the truce would be extended;  a “narrow” agreement, which would allow for the truce to be extended while a number of measures are implemented in the field, such as the opening of crossings; or another 24-hour extension of the truce, in an attempt to reach a long-term arrangement.

However, in the background there was always an additional possibility that neither side seemed to desire: the resumption of the war.

Therefore, the IDF and the Israeli defense establishment were not taking any chances and were also prepared for this outcome. The train route from Sderot to Ashkelon, part of which is exposed to fire from Gaza, was shut down on Sunday. At some of the kibbutzim near Gaza, the kindergartens were reinforced with concrete walls (which begs the question: Why was this done at the last minute? The defense establishment had 14 years to do it.)

Most importantly, the IDF vowed to respond to every rocket with especially strong firepower. “One thing is clear. We will not accept a war of attrition,” Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon emphasized on Monday evening.

Israel’s updated military doctrine, in this Gaza war, is to hit back even harder whenever Hamas fires rockets: at the rocket launchers, of course, but also more broadly against key Hamas facilities and leaders.

Shin Bet — the domestic security agency — meantime clarified the timing of its revelation on Monday that Hamas was trying to create a potent military infrastructure in the West Bank: so as to launch major terrorist attacks against Israel from a new direction, but also to stage a coup d’etat that would remove the more moderate Fatah faction from power in the West Bank.

Shin Bet officials said the revelation — which received wide media coverage as a new claim by Israel — was not meant to affect the Cairo negotiations. It was mere coincidence, they said: connected to the filing of indictments against around 70 suspects in the terror ring.

Shin Bet contends that the release of the information on the terror plot was not meant to serve as propaganda or psychological warfare to drive a wedge between Hamas and the Fatah-led PA (the Palestinian Authority) on the day that the future of the Gaza ceasefire was being determined.

Now it is clear that even if the ceasefire were extended, the chances of reaching a long-term understanding between Israel and Hamas through the Palestinian Authority were (and remain) low.

Prime Minister Netanyahu

Prime Minister Netanyahu

The bitter truth is that the government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which until now was dismissive of PA President Mahmoud Abbas and did everything it could to fritter away nine months of fruitless negotiations (mediated by America’s John Kerry), is now interested in putting Abbas in power in Gaza. It seems obvious that the Fatah faction would be better than the murderous, racist, implacable Hamas.

On the other hand, Israel’s government doesn’t hide its strong skepticism about Abbas and his ability to rule in the West Bank.

This government’s belief is that Hamas, either through the ballot box or by way of the gun, will eventually take over the West Bank.

Either way, the Israeli government does not truly want  a peace agreement or other understanding that it will obligate it to evacuate settlements and relocate settlers. Some in the government simply believe that the entire West Bank is rightfully Jewish territory — based on both the Bible and the lightning Six-Day victory in 1967. Others mostly stress the dangers that Israel would have to cope with, if Palestinians fully controlled the West Bank, leaving the Jewish state extremely thin and vulnerable.

Therefore, all the Netanyahu government does now is manage crises, like that occurring in Gaza today.  Israel will continue to jump from crisis to crisis.

August 19, 2014

Gaza Ceasefire Ended; No Deal — So Israeli Attack Aims at Hamas Leadership

Even before the scheduled end of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire at midnight, explosions erupted on Tuesday night — and the most significant was a long-distance assassination attempt by Israel.

Muhammad Deif, Hamas military chief

Muhammad Deif, Hamas military chief

Hamas said Mohammed Deif, the commander of its military wing, was the target of an airstrike that destroyed a house in Gaza City. Arab media said Deif’s wife and young child were killed. (It was not immediately clear whether Deif survived.)

A barrage of Hamas missiles — imprecisely aimed at Tel Aviv and at Ben-Gurion International Airport — was considered a retaliation for the assassination attempt. Dozens of rockets failed to kill any Israelis or cause significant damage.

And what of the negotiations in Cairo, where Egyptian mediators (with barely hidden advice from the United States) struggled mightily for a deal between Israel and Hamas?

Israeli officials say the head of the political wing of Hamas — Khaled Meshaal, who does his work from a hotel suite in far-off Qatar — intentionally sabotaged the negotiations, because he wants a united Arab stand to make much tougher demands. To show that Hamas gained something from this Gaza war, the radical Palestinian movement insists that a seaport and an airport should be opened quickly — while Israel and Egypt end the “siege” which strictly controls border entries and exits.

Khaled Meshaal

Khaled Meshaal

The core of the Meshaal obstacle, however, was his ego.  He appeared to be fighting for his honor, more than fighting for Hamas or the wider Palestinian people.

As the negotiations limped toward their latest deadline — after several extensions that were difficult for Egypt to arrange — Israel’s government honestly did not know what the outcome would be.

If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon knew, then they were not sharing that knowledge with the public — and not even with the rest of the cabinet. Ministers felt left out, and that was never going to increase Netanyahu’s chance of getting the cabinet’s backing for any deals that might be complicated or concession-filled.

It turns out that the basic Egyptian concept was — and is — to have an indefinite extension of the ceasefire, with the Israelis and Palestinians promising to hold serious, comprehensive negotiations in a month’s time. Israel and Egypt, though clearly not feeling that Gaza has become moderate or stable enough to have full shipping and flight rights, agreed not to veto the seaport and airport concept.

August 19, 2014

Major Claim by Israel’s Shin Bet — Hamas Launched Serious Plot in West Bank to Overthrow Fatah’s Palestinian Authority

by YOSSI MELMAN in Tel Aviv

Israel’s domestic security agency, Shin Bet, claims that it uncovered a serious plot by Hamas – including unprecedented military preparations – to start an uprising in the West Bank: not only against Israel, but against the Palestinian Authority.

According to Shin Bet, Hamas’s goals in the West Bank included – at some stage – “a military coup” to topple the P.A., which is led by the late Yasser Arafat’s al-Fatah faction.  In the Gaza Strip in 2007, after winning an election there, Hamas fighters soundly defeated al-Fatah men – killing many and forcing the survivors to leave.

Shin Bet officials, in issuing details today, insist that this is all true – and not an Israeli invention aimed at jamming a huge wedge between Hamas and the P.A.  The officials deny any connection with the fact that all day Monday, there was high tension over not knowing if a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas would be extended to allow for more negotiations in Cairo.

Shin Bet's logo: Hebrew words mean "The Defender That Won't Be Seen"

Shin Bet’s logo: Hebrew words mean “The Defender That Won’t Be Seen”

Hamas is branded a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, and many other governments. The Fatah faction, which as the P.A. has engaged in negotiations with Israel on-and-off for 21 years, is considered to be relatively moderate. (Rightwing Israelis argue that Fatah also backs terrorism and does not truly want to live in peace alongside a Jewish state of Israel.)

Shin Bet says its information about “military” organizing by Hamas in the West Bank is based on interrogations of recently arrested suspects. Information is being released at this time, because it is in legal documents that formalize charges against around 70 Hamas members.

The officials tell of 93 arrests in the current investigation, including a man who allegedly was recruited in Malaysia where he studied computer sciences. Hamas had him trained for code-breaking and cyberwarfare. 

According to information cleared by Israeli authorities for publication, the Hamas military organizing began in May – unrelated to the kidnap and murder of three young Israeli men in the West Bank a month later.

Over the weekend, the Israeli army destroyed the family homes of two Palestinians who are the prime suspects in the murder of the three Israelis. Human rights organizations complained that this was “collective punishment,” without any court indictments, trials, or convictions.

As for the “military” plot including a coup to take over the P.A., Shin Bet officials say the plan was hatched by Hamas activists in Turkey – with others in Jordan involved in the planning.

The plan included severe terrorist attacks inside Israel, launched from the West Bank, that would trigger harsh responses by Israel.  That, in turn, would lead – Hamas allegedly hoped – to the eruption of a widespread uprising by West Bank Palestinians: a third Intifada.

It seems that Israeli intelligence received some of its information on this plot from Jordan’s security agencies, which is believed to have spies inside various Palestinian factions – and Jordan is reputed to engage in harsh interrogations to extract information about alleged plots.

As part of the Israeli investigation in the West Bank, according to Shin Bet officials, dozens of weapons and hidden storage facilities were found.  Guns, valued at around half a million dollars, are believed to have been smuggled in from Jordan.

Shin Bet believes it broke up this plot before attacks on Israelis – or on the P.A. – could be carried out.  But one Shin Bet official said the information obtained proves that Hamas – and certainly its leadership outside the Palestinian territories – are deadly serious in their objective to take over the entire Palestinian movement.

August 18, 2014

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